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I. INTRODUCTION
Public and private regimes of behavior regulation coexist, in varying
degrees of harmony, in many aspects of life.1 Law, even under a narrow
definition that excludes private regulatory regimes, known as Private
Legal Systems (PLSs), must address the degree of accommodation public
regulatory regimes will afford their private counterparts. Some fields of
law—most notably contract and property law—enforce forms of private
1. The term “regulation” has a variety of definitions, some so broad as to encompass any
constraint that limits free choice and others so narrow as to relate only to government activity that
mandates consumer prices to firms in certain industries. Broadly speaking, regulation includes the
creation of norms, detection of violations of those norms, and enforcement of the norms on the
detected violators. To focus the discussion in this Article, the term “regulation” will be used to mean
activity (by any institution or individual) aimed at enforcing norms. Often, regulation is facilitated
through intervention of an entity other than the party that is potentially harmed by the violation of
the norm. However, one form of regulation (which this Article will refer to as transaction regulation)
involves mechanisms implemented by parties to the transaction with the intent to protect against
violations of norms that regard the transaction. For example, forming long-term relationships with
certain parties and abstaining from contracting with others would be considered a form of transaction
regulation. Another form of regulation (referred to as self-regulation) involves self-restraint by the
would-be norm violator. Regulation therefore spans a wide range of forms, from self-regulation by
the potential norm violator, through parties that are potentially harmed by the violation of the norm
and third-party “gatekeepers” that work on their behalf (see infra text accompanying note 29), to
regulation by networks and, finally, to regulation by government.
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regulation that are perceived as beneficial. Other fields of law—antitrust
law in particular—prohibit forms of private regulation that are perceived
as harmful.
Still other fields of law do not directly address private regulation, but
may be designed in ways that either facilitate or hinder coexistence of
public and private law in a given area. For example, imposing liability on
private institutions that unknowingly facilitate illegal activity assists in
preventing the illegal activity, but imposes an additional cost on the
private entities. This issue has received much attention recently in
connection with the media industry’s attempt to impose liability for
copyright violations on peer-to-peer exchanges (notably, Napster),2 as
well as regulators’ attempts to impose liability on online payment
systems that facilitate illegal gambling.3 This liability may deter some
efficient private schemes. The result may or may not be socially
beneficial depending on the social benefits from the private scheme and
their relative advantage or disadvantage over public counterparts.
The legal scholarship known as “private ordering” serves these
bodies of law by assessing the social benefits and relative advantages of
PLSs. In analyzing private institutions, this literature emphasizes two
elements that are used to regulate or enforce norms:4 repeated play and

2. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that
record companies and movie publishers made a prima facie case of copyright infringement against
Napster, a peer-to-peer system for online exchange of files); Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d
1051 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the posting of copyrighted material on an America Online
USENET newsgroup comes within the scope of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s safe-harbor
provision for “intermediate and transient storage”).
3. See, e.g., PayPal Inc. to Stop Processing Payments from New Yorkers, WALL ST. J., Aug.
22, 2002, at B8 (discussing the New York Attorney General’s investigation of PayPal, Inc., an online
payment system, for its involvement in processing payments related to online gambling activities).
4. Scholars offer a variety of definitions of the term “norms.” See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter,
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1656–57 (1996) (defining norms as obligations); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1999) (defining
norms as “all rules and regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and
organizational rules”); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining norms as “informal social regularities that individuals
feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external nonlegal sanctions, or both”); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1699–1701 (1996) (defining norms as rules that distinguish desirable and undesirable
behavior while giving a third party the authority to punish those engaging in undesirable behavior);
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
359, 363 n.24 (defining norms as “behavioral regularities that arise when humans are interacting
with each other, regardless of whether that interaction is face-to-face”); Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996) (using a rough definition of norms as
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reputation. This Article discusses a third element: network effects.
Network effects (or network benefits) are demand-side economies of
scale—the phenomenon that the utility to a user of a good or service
increases as additional people use it.5 Often, though not always,
realization of network effects requires interconnection between the users.
The institution that facilitates interconnection between users of a good or
service exhibiting network effects, thus enabling the realization of
network benefits, is called a network.
While a significant literature exists on the economics of network
effects and some scholars have discussed the application of network
effects in legal analysis,6 the private-ordering literature has for the most
part ignored the implications of network effects. This is a significant
shortcoming because the vast majority of PLSs examined in the literature
are networks, such as exchanges, merchant coalitions, and social circles.
This Article will explore the implications of network effects on the
ability and relative advantage of private institutions to regulate. While
the analysis in this Article is applicable to the enforcement of any norm,
the Article will focus on regulation as the mitigation of opportunistic
behavior in transactions. The Article presents three insights on private
ordering that are better understood through a network-effects analysis.
First, network effects make certain mechanisms far more effective in
enforcing norms. The Article classifies four such mechanisms commonly
used by networks and assesses in which market structures they will be
most effective. Second, network effects allow a certain type of
opportunistic behavior (which this Article, following recent economic

“social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not
to be done”). Since this Article examines a spectrum of regulators (i.e., norm enforcers) that
encompasses government as well as private actors and since the same “norm” may be enforced by
one of several regulators depending, among other things, on the relative efficiency of each regulator
in enforcing the specific norm, it is not sensible for this Article to use a definition that is based on
the identity of the regulator (i.e., it is not sensible to call something a norm if a private actor enforces
it but not if a government actor does). Therefore, this Article will take a very broad definition of
norms, to include all rules and regularities concerning human conduct (including legal and
organizational rules).
5. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 245–56
(2d ed. 2001) (analyzing exclusionary practices in the “new economy,” which is characterized by
significant network effects); David A. Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to
Promote Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 523 (1999); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
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literature, calls “degradation”)7 that is not feasible to the opportunistic
party in nonnetwork environments. Some norm-enforcing mechanisms
that are commonly used against “garden-variety” opportunism are
ineffective against degradation, making a regulator whose strengths lie in
these mechanisms less efficient in enforcing norms if degradation is
likely to occur. Third, networks are dynamic entities that evolve and
change their form to seize opportunities that increase the networks’
benefit to their members, such as increasing their ability or incentive to
regulate.8 The Article examines one such important dynamic:9 the ability
of networks to modify themselves so as to become more effective
regulators when the existing network has the ability to regulate
efficiently but not the incentive to do so.10
Part II of this Article examines regulation (i.e., norm-enforcing) in
general. This part will introduce the reader to the problem that a
regulator will face (opportunism), to the institutions that attempt to
mitigate this problem, and to the elements that facilitate private ordering:
repeated play, reputation, and network effects. Part III then looks in
depth at how network effects influence regulation. It explains the nature
and characteristics of network effects and then analyzes how network
effects enhance the ability to regulate on one hand, yet create new and
more powerful forms of opportunism on the other hand. On the
regulation-enhancing side, four types of mechanisms used by networks to
regulate are classified and discussed. On the opportunism-enhancing
side, a network-effects-driven type of opportunism called degradation is
explained and distinguished from the type of opportunism commonly
addressed in the private-ordering literature, which this Article calls
“breach.” The Article then examines the relationship between market
structure and the prevalent type of opportunism and touches briefly on

7. Degradation is a predatory act that weakens the network, harming smaller firms more
than larger ones, thereby giving larger firms an advantage over smaller competitors. This concept is
discussed in depth infra Part III.C.2.
8. For example, several networks may connect into a “network of networks,” merging the
networks into a single, larger network.
9. For a broader exploration of the patterns of evolution of PLSs (and in particular networks
serving as PLSs), see Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal
Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with the author). An
earlier, working-paper version of the article is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391780.
10. Such modified networks have been observed and discussed in antitrust scholarship, where
they have been called “middleware,” but have yet to receive significant attention from the privateordering literature.
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the relevant effects of opportunism of either type on social welfare.11
Part IV explores the circumstances in which networks are the most
efficient regulators. There is an implicit (and sometimes explicit)
competition between several regulatory regimes: government regulation,
network regulation (i.e., enforcement by networks), transaction
regulation (i.e., enforcement by the specific parties to any given
transaction), and self-regulation (i.e., self-restraint driven by morality).
Building on the analysis set forth in Part III regarding types of
opportunism and types of opportunism-mitigating mechanisms, this
Article predicts each regulator’s relative advantage in enforcing norms
based, inter alia, on the prevailing market structure. The regulator with
the best ability and incentive to enforce norms in given circumstances is
likely to win the “competition” between potential regulators and enforce
norms in that segment of human activity. Finally, Part V summarizes and
concludes.
This Article offers but an initial observation of the implications of
network effects on private ordering. The analysis offered in this Article
provides guidelines to future detailed empirical examination of the
utilization of network effects in creating institutions that enforce norms.
II. REGULATION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
A. Opportunism
Opportunistic default on obligations12 is an inherent risk in any
transaction between parties lacking complete control over each other’s
actions.13 Such behavior harms the parties to the transaction by reducing

11. For a definition of social welfare, see infra Part III.C.4.
12. Opportunism may be defined as “an act in which someone destroys part of the
cooperative surplus to secure a larger share of it.” Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market
Modernization of Law, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 150 (1996). For other general definitions of
opportunism, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985) (defining opportunism as “self-interest seeking
with guile”); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 834
(2002) (defining opportunism as “bad faith exploitation of uncertainty”). In the context of contract
law, opportunism has been defined as a situation in which one party “behaves contrary to the other
party’s understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s explicit
terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party.” Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 (1981).
13. This statement assumes that there is no anti-opportunism regulation of the transaction
(e.g., enforceable contract law). If such regulation exists, the statement would still be true where the
regulating regime has weaknesses or, in the case of contract law, where the contract is incomplete.
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the return on any investments they made in reliance on the defaulted
obligations. Since the devaluation of the reliance investments of injured
parties does not harm the defaulting party, the latter might choose to
default absent some adverse sanction to such behavior, even when this
results in a decrease in the combined welfare of all parties to the
transaction. The devaluation of reliance investments is thus a negative
externality imposed by opportunistic default on an obligation.14
Furthermore, recognizing the risk of default, parties to a transaction may
decide to invest less in reliance on the transaction than they would have
if opportunistic default had been less probable or less damaging; this
lower investment might result in lower utility from the transaction.
Both lowering the probability of opportunistic default on obligations
and decreasing the damage caused by such default increase the welfare
of potential parties to transactions. For that reason, potential parties to a
transaction seek forms of regulation that would achieve either or both
reduced probability and reduced damage from opportunistic default.
Different entities have different advantages and disadvantages as
regulators, and overlapping regulation by different entities may
complement or conflict with regulation by other entities.
B. Classifying Regulators
Robert Ellickson identified, in his seminal book Order Without Law,
five categories of regulators (which he calls “controllers”): first-party
controllers, second-party controllers, and three types of third-party

14. One may raise a “Coasian” argument that the negative externality of opportunism is
internalized by a decrease in the price buyers would be willing to pay in a transaction that is
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. For example, if Abe knows that Ben may act opportunistically
and reduce Abe’s benefits from the transaction by $2, Abe will be willing to pay Ben $2 less,
making him no worse and Ben no better by the opportunistic behavior. Of course, in that situation all
potential opportunists would have an incentive to act opportunistically (unless they can identify
themselves as nonopportunists) since they are already penalized by the buyer and so might as well
recoup the penalty by benefiting from opportunistic behavior. For example, Carol, who is also a
seller, might have considered not acting opportunistically towards Abe, but since Abe pays $2 less
than market price (assuming the worst of the seller’s behavior), Carol can only compete with Ben if
she too earns back the $2 by acting opportunistically. This equilibrium, in which all potential
opportunistic parties choose to act opportunistically while all injured parties reduce price and
reliance, is inefficient because it precludes efficient investments that rely on the fair execution of the
transaction. Regulators, by mitigating opportunism, allow either direct deterrence of opportunistic
behavior or differentiation between opportunistic parties and nonopportunistic parties enabling Abe
to offer a higher price to honest Carol than to opportunistic Ben, thus indirectly deterring Ben from
acting opportunistically.
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controllers—informal controllers (social forces), non-governmental
organization controllers, and government controllers (the legal system).15
1. Self-regulation
First-party regulation, or self-regulation,16 gives the role of regulator
to the entity with the greatest ability to both detect and prevent norm
violation—the potential norm violator herself. However, this person has
the least incentive to regulate, as she is typically the primary beneficiary
of the opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, this form of regulation is
highly vulnerable to self-deception (i.e., the would-be norm violator may
interpret norms so as not to conflict with desired, self-serving behavior).
Finally, self-control is vulnerable to differences in culture or personal
morality—actions that are morally repugnant to one person may be
acceptable to another, and so one person’s expectations of another’s selfcontrol may be frustrated even in the absence of self-deception.
2. Transaction regulation
In the context of norms applying to personal interactions or business
transactions (as do most norms), the regulators next in proximity to the
norm violator are the other parties to the transaction. Regulation by the
parties to the transaction, referred to by Ellickson as “second-party
controllers,”17 may also be referred to as transaction regulation.
Transaction regulation includes relationship-building measures, such as
bilateral bonds18 or integration,19 and the use of third-party guarantors,20
etc.
Second-party control presents a different set of advantages and
disadvantages. The second party has an unbiased incentive to prevent
15. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
126–32, 241–46 (1991).
16. The term self-regulation is frequently used to describe all forms of nongovernment
regulation. This Article, however, differentiates between the various types of nongovernment
regulation: self-regulation (facilitated by first-party controllers, in Ellickson’s terms), transaction
regulation (facilitated by second-party controllers), and network regulation (facilitated by informal
and organizational controllers).
17. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 130–32, 246–48.
18. See, e.g., Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, 12 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 214 (1996).
19. See, e.g., Andy C.M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical
Control, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 590–91 (1999).
20. See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 47 (1999).
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opportunistic default on obligations to the extent that the opportunism is
at its expense,21 and it also possesses intimate knowledge of the
transaction’s subject matter (e.g., the industry in which it operates).
However, its ability to punish opportunism is limited since, absent
coordination with or assistance from others, it can only deprive the
defaulting party of their future mutual transactions.22 If the value of such
transactions is not great,23 this sanction may fail to deter some
opportunistic behavior.
3. Government regulation
Third-party controllers include the government and PLSs (which
Ellickson further classifies into informal controllers and organization
controllers).24 Government is a natural candidate for regulating
opportunism in transacting. Having a monopoly on violence and
controlling specialized enforcement agencies that can enforce
injunctions, fines, and damages awards, the government can impose
unique sanctions such as incarceration25 and has a greater ability to
impose fines than do most other potential regulators. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, government enforcement has a significant role in regulating; so
great a role, in fact, that many view it as the sole, or at least the primary,
21. Some parties may enter a transaction with the intent to defraud and therefore would not
have an interest in preventing opportunism at any stage. However, if a mechanism were available to
prevent opportunism, the refusal of a party to implement it would signal to other parties a likely
intent to defraud. Therefore, at least ex ante, parties to a transaction are likely to agree to implement
mechanisms mitigating opportunism.
22. This statement assumes that the agreements between the first and second parties are
enforced by the promisee. If they are enforced by government through private actions (e.g., if the
promisee sues in court to enforce the agreement), then the form of regulation is a hybrid in which
detection of deviation from the norm is done primarily by the second-party controller while
formation of the norm and enforcement against violations are done by the government. Thus, it
would not be a pure form of second-party regulation.
23. For example, the value of future transactions would not be great if the defaulting party
were able to transact with other, similarly attractive firms.
24. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 130–32. Both informal controllers and organization
controllers are typically (but not always) networks and make use of network effects to enforce
norms. Therefore, this Article does not make the distinction between these two types of networkbased PLSs.
25. Despite government’s ability to punish by incarceration, only the most severe norm
violations are punishable by incarceration. Not all violations of norms are criminal; some give rise
only to civil sanctions and others allow no legal cause of action at all. Even among criminal norm
violations, very often the offender is sentenced to a fine rather than imprisonment. The criminal
system deals with many forms of harmful behavior, varying in their degree of harm to society. Since
sanctions are determined in proportion to the severity of the crime, the most deterring of government
sanctions are not used against most common norm violations.
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method of regulation. Contract law is intended to lend the power of the
government’s enforcement machinery to parties injured by breach of
obligations. Commercial law provides more specific rules for certain
common types of commercial transactions intended, among other
reasons, to curb opportunistic frustration of the goals of those
transactions.26 Consumer protection law is, to a significant degree, aimed
at correcting information asymmetries that make opportunistic behavior
more likely.27 Antitrust law similarly addresses opportunism that is
caused by the possession or attempted acquisition of market power.28
Industry-specific regulation often monitors and remedies opportunism by
or against the firms it regulates.
Because the government, compared to other potential regulators, is
usually the most distant from the norm violator, it has significant
monitoring costs and costs of error. The government may attempt to
reduce monitoring costs either by creating a specialized regulator or,
more commonly, by allowing private rights of action (which utilize the
lower monitoring costs of transaction regulation and, after verification by
a court or agency, allow the use of the government’s sanctions).
Both techniques suffer from significant flaws. Regulators are very
expensive, are subject to capture, and have greater monitoring costs,
even under optimal conditions, than the parties to the transaction. Private
rights of action are subject to abuse since regardless of their merit they
impose costs (legal, reputational, temporal, etc.) on the defendant and
therefore may be manipulated by a plaintiff to extract a payoff from the
defendant. Furthermore, the governmental verification system, usually a
trial before a court, is imperfect as judges often lack the information,
expertise, or time to properly verify suits.

26. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1749–50
(2002) (“The law also provides a benefit by providing default rules and monitoring for opportunism,
which efficiently reduces the ex ante precautions that have to be taken by contracting parties.”).
27. See, e.g., Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297, 306–07 (Mass. 1980)
(“The overall purpose of [the Massachusetts statute regulating business practices for consumer
protection] is that of ‘providing proper disclosure of information and a more equitable balance in the
relationship of consumers to persons conducting business activities.’”). Removing information
asymmetries and thus creating an “equitable balance” between the transacting parties requires not
only the provision of information (i.e., disclosure), but also the necessary analytical tools to assess
this information which depend on the sophistication of the consumer.
28. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 762 (7th Cir.
1996) (distinguishing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)).
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4. Network regulation
Third parties other than the government are also enlisted as
regulators if they have relative advantages over the parties to the
transaction and the government. For example, investment banks,
accountants, law firms, and other financial intermediaries often serve as
“gatekeepers,” since they have advantageous access to information
regarding potential opportunism.29 While gatekeepers are third parties,
regulation through them may be considered more in line with Ellickson’s
classification of second-party control if the gatekeepers’ role is limited to
providing informational and other services to the second party, but the
actual enforcement is done by the second party primarily through
refusing to deal with the opportunistic party. In such cases, the
gatekeeper is not a controller but merely a provider of a service that is
used by the second party to regulate.
In contrast, other third parties, such as exchanges and trade
associations, create, adjudicate, and enforce norms that are intended to
reduce opportunism.30 Typically, such third parties not only enjoy
potential informational advantages, but are also able to impose sanctions
against offenders that may rival or surpass the government’s sanctions in
their effectiveness, thus deterring opportunism and hence decreasing its
likelihood. Furthermore, the same third parties are also able to replace
defaulted transactions with substitute transactions more efficiently than
the parties to the transaction themselves, thus mitigating the damages
from default. These third parties are networks, and their efforts to
enforce norms are network regulation.31
29. See Stephen J. Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916 (1998);
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 (1986); Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions,
87 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1999).
30. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting
Out]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law].
31. For a discussion of network effects, see infra Part III.A. Ellickson differentiates between
two controllers—informal controllers and organizational controllers—both of which are usually
networks. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 130–32. The difference between these two types of
controllers is mainly in the array of enforcement mechanisms they wield. Informal controllers make
use of information and switching mechanisms, while organizational controllers make use of these
two mechanisms and also of exclusion and control mechanisms. These mechanisms will be
explained infra Part III.B. There may be some exceptions in which a specific informal or
organizational controller would not be a network. But as explained infra Parts IV.B and IV.C, in
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Networks appear in many forms: trade associations, commodity
exchanges, electricity grids, internet auction sites, and peer-to-peer and
business-to-business exchanges.32 In most cases, networks do not exist
solely to regulate. Rather, they exist primarily to exploit network effects
and thus increase members’ utility from transacting. This Article does
not attempt to explain networks in general, but rather focuses on
networks as regulators. In certain circumstances, networks are better
regulators than the parties to the transaction or other third parties such as
the government. In such cases, networks will not only facilitate
transactions, but also act as regulators. Anti-opportunism mechanisms
instituted by the network may displace counterpart measures applied by
other regulators (e.g., government regulation, bilateral contracting, etc.).
Identifying these circumstances and the mechanisms used by networks to
combat opportunism is a goal of this Article.
5. Interaction between multiple regulators
Regulation by one regulator does not necessarily exclude other
regulators. Very often each regulator regulates those aspects in which it
is most efficient, relying upon another for regulation of other aspects.
The prospect of being regulated by a default, less efficient regulator may
even serve as an incentive to adhere to the more efficient regulator. For
example, transaction regulation very often operates “in the shadow of the
law,” efficiently mitigating opportunism in transactions with lower value
while relying on the ability to sue in court to mitigate opportunism in
higher-value transactions in which the costs and delays of the
government regulation do not dissipate most of the value of the
dispute.33
However, to a certain extent, each regulator’s activity may weaken
another regulator’s ability to regulate. Self-regulation (i.e., morality and
many circumstances networks tend to have an advantage in regulating over nonnetwork third-party
controllers, and therefore nonnetwork third-party controllers tend to be uncommon.
32. Examples of business environments significantly influenced by networks include
exchanges (securities exchanges, commodity exchanges, etc.); financial networks (credit card
networks, ATM networks, check clearance, etc.); communications (long distance and international
telephony, cellular telephony, internet backbone services, etc.); transportation (air, sea, and land
transportation); mail and express services (domestic and international); and energy networks
(electricity, gas and oil pipelines).
33. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (noting that private resolution of disputes
receives a powerful incentive from “the outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is
needed”).
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self-control) may be more lax in a strict environment that is rife with
rules enforced by other regulators. For example, one may obey the
externally enforced rules but not exercise significant self-restraint in
matters not prohibited by the rules.34 Network regulation is often biased
by the existence of government regulation because regulated parties’
activities may be aimed at either appeasing the government regulator or
“capturing” it, either of which may diverge from the course of action
needed to efficiently mitigate opportunism. Where government
regulation is more efficient but the government lacks the means to
enforce its regulation, as is the case in some developing countries and
occasionally in certain areas of developed countries, network regulation
that substitutes for government law enforcement becomes redundant
when the government increases enforcement.35 Likewise, network
regulation can reduce the effectiveness of transaction regulation by
decreasing the quality of partners to bilateral contracting who remain
outside the network.36 The converse is also true—transaction regulation
may reduce the effectiveness of network regulation by diverting
transactions away from the network, thereby decreasing the effectiveness
of the network’s enforcement mechanisms.37
C. Elements that Facilitate Private Ordering
The literature on private ordering examines regulation by parties
other than government: rules, norms, and institutions that are selfimposed by private parties (or evolve)38 to govern their behavior and

34. On the weakening of corporate morality as a result of increased rule-based regulation, see
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the
Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1995).
35. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2445 (2000) (“Private order can serve as either a complement to or a
substitute for public order . . . . An improvement in the law will increase the use of complementary
private-order mechanisms; it will similarly decrease the use of substituting private-order
mechanisms.”); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 91–97 (2000)
(discussing the effectiveness of public enforcement of property rights, rather than public
enforcement of criminal law, in reducing organized crime, which is a PLS).
36. See Raja Kali, Endogenous Business Networks, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 615, 629 (1999).
37. This Article will explain what the network’s specific enforcement mechanisms are infra
Part III.B. Transaction regulation reduces the effectiveness of the exclusion and switching
mechanisms due to a decrease in network benefits, and of the control and information mechanisms
due to lack of network control over the bilateral transactions.
38. Some norms are not contemplated and imposed, but evolve. See Posner, supra note 4, at
1699 (“The rule-like nature of a norm should not disguise the fact that norms are not enacted and
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transactions.39 Macaulay’s seminal work in this field observed that few
contractual disputes are litigated and most are settled without resorting to
government-enforced laws.40 Subsequent research pointed out two
advantages in mitigating opportunism that certain nongovernment
institutions may possess. In analyzing the institutions that mitigate
opportunism, the private-ordering literature emphasizes two elements:
repeated play and reputation.
1. Repeated play
The repeated-play element addresses the perception of the parties to
a transaction that they are likely to transact again in the future. As a
result of this perception, each party’s behavior in the current transaction
may have consequences in future transactions.41 For example, if John
promises to buy Dan’s car but then reneges on that promise, Dan may
refuse to transact with John in the future or may deal with John in the
future under terms less favorable to John, both as a punishment and
because Dan now takes into account the greater likelihood of John’s
defaulting again. Knowing these are the likely consequences, John will
be hesitant to renege on his promise in the first place, at least if he
anticipates that the cost of losing future transactions with Dan will be
greater than the benefit from reneging on the current promise.

enforced like statutes. It is more plausible to say that when people observe some behavior, they more
or less spontaneously approve or disapprove of it (or fail to react), and then reward, penalize, or
ignore the actor.”).
39. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 113 (1998); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Robert C.
Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989); Milhaupt & West, supra note 35.
40. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963).
41. See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 100–06 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); Marleen
A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate LaborManagement Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 927 (1993) (“Economists suggest, however,
that repeated play of a noncooperative game usually produces results similar to those achieved under
a cooperative game in which such commitments are possible. Specifically, repetition allows the
implicit agreement to refrain from opportunism to become self-enforcing because each player
recognizes that the decision to defect in any round of play will trigger a similar response from the
other player in the next round. The combination of the fear of retaliation for defecting and the
prospect of future benefits from cooperating may cause the players to reach a mutually beneficial
solution. Once the players make the initial move to cooperate, a ‘lock-in’ effect arises that promotes
a pattern of collaboration through the game.”).
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2. Reputation
Reputation expands the scope of future consequences, by enabling
other firms that were not parties to a given transaction to learn of the
trustworthiness of the parties to that transaction and to act on that
knowledge.42 Returning to the above example, John might realize that
not only will reneging on his promise to Dan cause Dan to transact with
him less favorably in the future, but John may also expect similar
treatment from anyone who learns of his default. This reaction has
nothing to do with sympathy for Dan—it is in the best interest of each
person to be averse to dealing with another person who is likely to
default on promises. A credible account of past behavior (i.e., reputation)
is usually perceived as a good proxy for assessing the likelihood of future
default on obligations. A party’s reputation therefore interests third
parties and affects their disposition towards the person whose reputation
they are aware of.
3. Network effects
This Article discusses a third element that affects the analysis of
opportunism-mitigating institutions—network effects. Private-ordering
scholarship has examined business environments that are dominated by
networks, such as merchant coalitions43 and commodity and financial
exchanges.44 It has also noted the use of social networks to combat
opportunism in business transactions.45 However, it rarely distinguishes
between institutions that are networks (that is, institutions characterized
by network effects) and those that are not.46 As a result, the literature

42. See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373, 409–20 (1990); Kreps, supra note 41, at 106–08.
43. See Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California,
13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 202 (1997); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions
in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993).
44. See, e.g., Banner, supra note 39; Bernstein, supra note 39; Stephen Craig Pirrong, The
Efficient Scope of Private Transactions-Cost-Reducing Institutions: The Successes and Failures of
Commodity Exchanges, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229 (1995); Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the
World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000).
45. See, e.g., Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group:
An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 349 (1981). See also Bernstein,
Private Commercial Law, supra note 30, at 110; Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 30, at 130; Kali,
supra note 36.
46. Some of the literature does make relevant distinctions. For example, McMillan and
Woodruff distinguish between “bilateral relational contracting” and “multilateral relational
contracting.” See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35, at 2430–35. Not all multilateral contracts
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usually discusses only types of opportunism that are common to both
network and nonnetwork business environments47 and primarily
examines regulation mechanisms that are common to both of these
environments.48
Below, this Article examines how transacting in a network
environment involves both unique risks of opportunism and unique, or at
least in many circumstances significantly superior, abilities to regulate
against opportunism. The next section begins this analysis by examining
the relevant characteristics of networks.
III. REGULATING IN A NETWORK ENVIRONMENT
A. Network Effects
1. What are network effects?
While networks may enjoy economies of scale and scope in
production, the unique quality of a network is economies of scale and
scope in demand. Economists refer to this phenomenon as “network
effects”: the value of membership in a network is enhanced by an
increase in the number of other members or in the other members’ usage
of the network.49 An example is an internet marketplace, such as eBay. If
I want to sell an item, the probability that I will find a potential buyer
increases as more people use the same internet marketplace. And as a
are necessarily associated with networks. However, most of the multilateral contracts examined in
the literature relate to networks, probably due to the advantages that a network possesses (over other
multilateral institutions) in regulating.
47. Typically, the private-ordering literature examines opportunism of the type this Article
defines as “breach” infra Part III.C.1. Transacting in network environments may also risk a
markedly different type of opportunism which this Article defines as “degradation” infra Part
III.C.2.
48. For example, as mentioned above, the literature emphasizes the role of reputation in
restraining opportunism. Networks may be able to exploit economies of scale and solve collective
action problems in monitoring reputation (see discussion on the information mechanism infra Part
III.B.1), but they also have other opportunism-reducing mechanisms in their arsenal, including the
ability to coordinate among the network members so that the opportunistic party faces a collective
sanction from all members. Some scholars have addressed the need for coordination. See, e.g.,
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35, at 2439 (“Providing information about those who cheat may
not suffice to deter cheating when punishment is costly—coordination may be required . . . .”).
However, they have not focused on the connection between network effects and the effectiveness of
coordinating mechanisms.
49. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network
Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 824 (1986).
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buyer, the probability that I will find a person wishing to sell the very
item I seek likewise increases as more people use the marketplace.
In industries characterized by economies of scale in supply, firms
lower their production costs by drawing more demand for their product,
allowing them to produce more of the product and thus benefit from the
economies of scale. But in network industries, firms can lower their
costs,50 without having to wrest customers from their competitors, by
interconnecting with competitors (i.e., making their product or service
compatible with the competitors’), thus allowing each firm’s customers
to reap demand-side economies of scale as if the customers of that firm’s
competitors were its own.51 As Richard Posner notes, “[E]conomies of
consumption presuppose uniformity rather than a common source.”52
For example, the benefits to customers of a cellular telephone
company increase as customers are able to talk to more people with their
phones. A cellular telephone carrier could, by interconnecting with
another carrier, offer its customers the added benefits of talking with the
other carrier’s customers, making each carrier’s service as attractive as if
one of the carriers acquired all of the other’s customers. This
characteristic of network industries creates a significant incentive for

50. Alternatively, firms can increase the consumer’s benefit from its products without
increasing costs, which is equivalent to lowering costs.
51. Compare the following two situations. First, Acme Corp. and Ajax Corp. are rival steel
producers. Steel is produced most cheaply when the output is at least 60 tons. This is a normal,
supply-side economy of scale. The total demand for steel from all customers is 100 tons. Both Acme
and Ajax vie to get orders for 60 tons of steel, but only one of them can reach that goal since if one
has orders for 60 tons, other customers demand only 40 additional tons. If Acme succeeds in
receiving orders for 60 tons of steel, its production costs will be lower than Ajax’s, and (assuming
production costs don’t rise again for production above 60 tons) it would then be able to undercut
Ajax’s prices and receive orders for the remaining 40 tons, driving Ajax out of business. Since both
Acme and Ajax know that the competition for the first 60 tons determines which of them will
survive, both would expend significant resources in defeating the other.
Contrast that situation with the second situation: Acme and Ajax are rival telephone
companies, and their networks are connected so that an Acme customer can call an Ajax customer
and vice versa. Telephone service provides peak utility to the customers when it connects at least 60
people. This is a network effect—a demand-side economy of scale. There are only 100 people in the
territory Acme and Ajax operate in. If each has at least 30 customers, then each firm’s telephone
network is connected to 60 people and provides peak utility. While each company might want to
expand its business by taking its rival’s customers, it is not a survival contest. If the connection
between customers of the two firms is of the same quality as the connection between customers of
the same firm, then both firms would offer the same utility to their users regardless of differences in
the number of customers each firm has.
52. POSNER, supra note 6, at 248.
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creating interfirm networks.53 It also makes membership in a large
network (i.e., the ability to transact through the network) a valuable
asset.54 The network’s ability to exclude a member may therefore be a
powerful sanction.55
Economists categorize network effects into two types: direct and
indirect. Direct network effects are “generated through a direct physical
effect of the number of purchasers on the value of a product.”56 For
example, a telephone network derives its network effects directly from
the ability of each user to communicate with each of the other users.57
Indirect network effects, in contrast, are observed when the value of a
product increases as a result of an increase in the purchase or use of a
complementary product. For example, if more people use Excel, there
will be more people any given user can obtain help from and more books
and courses on how to use Excel; if more people carry MasterCards,
more merchants will take MasterCards, making the cards more valuable
to both cardholders and merchants.58
The concept of network effects is not at all a novel one. Perhaps the
most ancient example of recognition of the enhanced benefits that result
from connectivity between entities is found in the book of Genesis:
“Here they are, one people with a single language, and now they have
started to do this [building the Tower of Babel]; henceforward nothing
53. For example, banks created clearinghouses to facilitate the exchange and redemption of
bank notes and later checks. See Alan S. Frankel, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and
Exchange of Money, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 325 (1998). Later, banks created networks facilitating
ATM and credit card transactions. Id. at 338–41.
54. This does not mean that network effects inevitably result in natural monopolies.
Differences in the quality of competing network goods or in their production costs may offset the
relative advantage of the larger network. Furthermore, at a certain point, production costs often
exhibit decreasing returns to scale (i.e., they rise as production increases). This increase in cost may
offset the increasing returns to scale derived from the network effect. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen
E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671, 672 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
55. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 39, at 1767–68 (“Although most transactors are willing to
deal with nonmembers (albeit somewhat reluctantly and on slightly different terms) as long as they
have good reputations, they are extremely reluctant to deal with someone who has been expelled
from an association. As one mill explained, for a merchant, ‘be[ing] expelled [from a shippers’
association] is usually a death blow to [his] business.’” (alterations in original)).
56. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 54, at 671.
57. See Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974) (noting network effects in communications services
industries and examining the influence of network effects on pricing and barriers to entry into the
industry).
58. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of
Networks, 10 ANTITRUST 36 (1996).
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they have a mind to do will be beyond their reach.”59 Language is
characterized by network effects—the benefit derived from
communicating in a language increases significantly as more people are
familiar with it.60 Increased “membership” in this network (i.e., fluency
in the language) allows communication and coordination among a larger
number of people, which confers greater benefits to each of them. Babel
was destroyed by undoing its linguistic network:
‘Come, let us go down there and confuse their speech, so that they will
not understand what they say to one another.’ So the Lord dispersed
them from there all over the earth, and they left off building the city.
That is why it is called Babel, because the Lord there made a babble of
the language of all the world.61

In the rest of this section, this Article will discuss two aspects of
network effects that are important in their implications on networks’
effectiveness as regulators. First, this Article will examine compatibility,
which produces network effects, but the manipulation of which may be a
powerful form of opportunistic behavior. Second, this Article will
discuss the literature analyzing the impact of network effects on forms of
organization. This Article adds to that line of literature by showing how a
network form of organization enforces norms and when it is effective in
doing so.
2. Compatibility, incompatibility, and harm from compatibility
Network effects are derived from compatibility, which allows several
people to use the same network. Compatibility may be achieved by joint
decision (e.g., coordinated acceptance of a standard) or unilaterally by a
single firm constructing an “adapter” that makes its product compatible
with another.62 Private incentives for compatibility may differ from
public incentives, possibly resulting in private action that fails to
maximize social welfare from the network effects. One strand of the
literature on network effects examines the choice between unilateral and

59. Genesis 11:6 (New English Version).
60. For a more contemporary analysis of network effects of language, see Jeffrey Church &
Ian King, Bilingualism and Network Externalities, 26 CAN. J. ECON. 337 (1993).
61. Genesis 11:7–8 (New English Version).
62. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 434–39 (1985).
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coordinated facilitation of compatibility.63 This issue is of considerable
importance to antitrust scholarship, as coordinated facilitation of
compatibility is usually more suspect of being used for anticompetitive
ends than its unilateral counterpart, and it is therefore important to
understand whether it has a redeeming advantage in increasing social
welfare through exploitation of network effects.64
Partial compatibility (i.e., compatibility among some but not all
firms or individuals) results in competition between several networks.65
Scholars dispute whether this competition leads, as may be expected of a
competitive process, to the adoption of the most efficient network (e.g.,
the network providing the most efficient service or promulgating the
most efficient standard or norm). Katz and Shapiro demonstrate that the
presence of network effects leads to multiple equilibria in a competition
between networks, and consumer expectation is key in determining
which equilibrium emerges.66 Generally, as the argument goes,
consumers will prefer to join a network that they perceive as likely to
become or is already the market leader. This preference may trump
consumers’ preferences regarding the product or service itself, so that an
inferior product that is perceived to be the market leader, perhaps
because it was a first-mover into the market, will be preferred over
superior but smaller competitors.67
63. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of
Interfaces, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 9, 32 (1992) [hereinafter Farrell & Saloner, Control of Interfaces]
(finding that when adapters do not facilitate perfect compatibility, their introduction might reduce
social welfare below that in an industry without adapters at all); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Coordination Through Committees and Markets, 19 RAND J. ECON. 235 (1988) (comparing
committee agreement on standards, unilateral declarations of standards by single firms followed by
independent decisions by other firms concerning which standard to follow, and a hybrid system
adapting features of both the committee and the market leadership mechanisms).
64. See Eliason Corp. v. Nat’l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating
that alleged boycotts arising from industry self-regulation do not give rise to a Sherman Act
violation absent discrimination or manifestly anticompetitive and unreasonable conduct); FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION & UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000). But see Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461, 468 (1941) (condemning coordinated activity aimed at preventing and
punishing “style piracy” and stating that “even if copying were an acknowledged tort under the law
of every state, that situation would not justify petitioners in combining together to regulate and
restrain interstate commerce”).
65. Members of each network enjoy compatibility among themselves but not with members
of other networks. If members of one network were compatible with members of another network,
the two networks would have been, in effect, a single network, and thus would not compete with
each other.
66. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 62.
67. Id. at 439. See also Katz & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 825.
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This argument led to a line of literature examining network effects as
barriers to entry and as the cause of the alleged persistence or “lock-in”
of less efficient network goods.68 If network “lock-in” theory, which has
been disputed by some scholars, is correct, then an inefficient norm may
nonetheless prevail because the network enforcing it is larger and
therefore confers greater network effects than rival networks enforcing
other more efficient but less popular norms. However, even if the “lockin” theory is correct, it may have less force regarding the perseverance of
inefficient norms than that of a technical standard because there are
several potential regulators other than networks that could adopt a more
efficient norm if the regulating network declines to adopt it. The bigger
the relative advantage of a network in enforcing the norm,69 the more
resistant it would be to the threat of competing regulators (and thus the
more able it is to persist with an inefficient norm). The less efficient the
network’s norm is compared to the alternative norm, the lower the
network’s resistance to the threat of competing regulation. Network
“lock in,” if it is significant, may also affect the resilience of networks in
adapting themselves to increase their ability and incentive to regulate
efficiently.70
Increased compatibility does not always increase social welfare. First
of all, network effects (i.e., demand-side increasing return to scale) are
68. Katz and Shapiro demonstrated that the presence of network effects may lead to excessive
standardization. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 49. Farrell and Saloner created a model suggesting that
new technology may not be adopted even if it is superior to existing technology, because of “excess
inertia” caused by the presence of an installed base. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and
Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 954
(1986). Among the anecdotal empirical evidence they cite in support of their theory is the persistence of
the allegedly inefficient “QWERTY” keyboard, an anecdote that was used in another article to
demonstrate that industries may lock in to inefficient standards. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics
of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985). Other scholars rejected the likelihood of an inefficient
lock-in. Liebowitz and Margolis refuted the lock-in hypothesis in the QWERTY anecdote as well as in
another much-cited anecdote—the VHS/Beta competition over the video cassette standard. See S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990); S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependency, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 208–09
(1995). On these two anecdotes and a few others, see also Michael I. Krauss, Regulation v. Markets in
the Development of Standards, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 800–08 (1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen
E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice be a Concern to Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283,
314–16 (1996). This issue is still hotly debated among scholars. See, e.g., William E. Cohen,
Competition and Foreclosure in the Context of Installed Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST
L.J. 535, 539–46 (1996).
69. A discussion of the circumstances that affect networks’ ability to enforce norms will
follow infra Part IV.B.
70. This Article will discuss networks’ ability to change in a manner that increases their
incentive to regulate efficiently infra Part IV.B.3.
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usually reduced and might even reverse above a certain point. At a point,
they may become “network defects”—a net disutility from an increase in
the number or volume of users of the network good. Reasons for this
reversal may include congestion on the network or relative advantages of
one system over another that have to be sacrificed to ensure
compatibility.71
Second, the connectivity that enables the flow of positive
externalities also enables the flow of negative externalities. For example,
a computer virus that exploits a loophole in Microsoft Outlook is much
more dangerous when most people use that program (and therefore
become infected and subsequently infect others). Similarly, while
interaction between people is the source of network benefits in a social
network, it is also the channel by which communicable diseases spread;
tighter social connectivity results in faster and more harmful
communication of diseases. Indeed the recent SARS epidemic
demonstrated the importance of quarantining (a social network’s form of
reduction in network connectivity).
Therefore, there may be a maximum efficient size for a network and
a refusal to allow compatibility with other systems may be designed to
prevent a network from expanding beyond its efficient size. Furthermore,

71. Congestion is a major limit on efficient scales in rivalrous networks, i.e., networks in
which, besides the positive network externality, there is a negative externality imposed by an
additional member of the network on the other members. Rivalrous networks include, inter alia,
cellular phones, broadband internet, and peer-to-peer information networks. Nonrivalrous networks,
such as languages, PC or video cassette standards, etc., do not suffer from congestion; it is no more
difficult for me to express myself in English merely because many millions of additional people also
express themselves in English. However, other traits might impose a limit on the efficient size of the
network. For example, certain languages may express some matters in greater precision than others
and compatibility, meaning integrating one language into another or creating a one-to-one translation
for each word, will result in losing those nuances. Eskimos are said to have hundreds of words
describing types of ice. See Jennifer L. Tomsen, “Traditional” Resource Uses and Activities:
Articulating Values and Examining Conflicts in Alaska, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 167, 196 (2002)
(“Yupik Eskimos living in central Alaska developed an immense variety of words to describe the
snow and ice around them.”). To allow complete compatibility with other languages, all these
nuanced differences must be sacrificed and the various words translated into the general word “ice.”
The same is true for standards. For example, the JPEG computer graphic file standard is better than
the competing GIF standard for multi-color images, but poorer when the image contains large areas
with the same color. See John Wurtzel, GIF vs. JPEG, (Jul. 31, 1997), at http://hotwired.lycos.com/
webmonkey/geektalk/97/30/index3a.html?tw=design. The choice between standards or languages
will depend on which nuances or special advantages are more commonly used by each prospective
member of the network. Those with a strong preference for a nuance or specific advantage will
prefer to maintain this advantage even at the price of foregoing additional network benefits (e.g.,
people who care for minute differentiation when referring to types of ice might prefer to speak a
more obscure, but also more exacting, language).
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facilitating compatibility has various costs.72 For this reason, a refusal to
be compatible may at times increase social welfare.
However, firms may have incentives to refuse to be compatible even
when compatibility would increase social welfare. Farrell and Saloner
observe that in deciding whether to make two technologies compatible
where one technology is supplied by a single firm, that firm may have an
incentive to make conversion costly.73 Cremer, Rey, and Tirole expand
on this insight, terming this increase in the cost of compatibility (or a
reduction in its quality) “degradation.”74 They refer to compatibility as
“connectivity” and examine the plausibility of such a strategy and its
effect on social welfare. This Article examines, among other issues,
“degradation” as a form of opportunistic behavior.
3. Network effects and forms of organization
While the social welfare implications of network effects have been
and continue to be examined thoroughly, less attention has been given to
the implications of network effects on the form of organization. Even
less attention has been given within this latter issue to the implications of
network effects on institutions that mitigate opportunism (i.e., how
network effects are used to fight “garden-variety” opportunism and how
institutions combat opportunism that is unique to network environments).
Much of the research following Macaulay’s observation on opting
out of the (public) legal system examines bilateral, relationship-based
transacting, in which reputational investments in the relationship serve as
collateral against opportunism. Geertz notes that buyers and sellers in
bazaars tend to pair off in recurrent transactions.75 Posner points out a
similar pattern of “barter friendships” within primitive societies, which
require the parties to observe standards of loyalty similar to those they

72. These costs include actual costs of coordination, loss of freedom to vary due to the need
to remain compatible, forced disclosure of proprietary information, facilitating anticompetitive
coordination, etc.
73. Farrell & Saloner, Control of Interfaces, supra note 63, at 26–28.
74. Jacques Cremer, Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, Connectivity in the Commercial Internet, 48
J. INDUS. ECON. 433, 435 (2000).
75. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Marketing, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 28, 30–31 (1978). For similar observations, see also CYRIL BELSHAW,
TRADITIONAL EXCHANGES AND MODERN MARKETS 78–81 (1965) (noting that traders in traditional
markets tend to personalize their exchange relations to mitigate contractual uncertainty or
opportunism).
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owe their kinsmen.76 Such a status and its attached obligations serve to
mitigate opportunism despite the absence of public enforcement.77 Landa
expands Geertz’s and Posner’s observations by considering a wider
network relationship, which she identifies as “an ethnically
homogeneous middleman group.”78 This group facilitates exchanges
where government enforcement of law is deficient—and the certainty of
abiding by contracts is consequently lacking—by taking advantage of the
high barriers to entry into an ethnic social group. These high barriers
create a need to stay on good terms with one’s existing ethnic group.79
Landa follows the method of analysis used earlier by Akerlof to explain
the caste system in India:80 an ethnic group can impose an efficient code
of behavior through the threat of exclusion, and it can provide low-cost,
accurate information on the trustworthiness of its members by
economizing on information collection. Landa’s focus, therefore, is on
networks’ mitigation of informational asymmetries.
A few scholars have examined the effects networks have in
coordinating punishment against opportunists. Greif modeled a
“Multilateral Punishment Strategy” patterned after the Maghribi
merchant coalitions.81 His model considers what is effectively a
decentralized network in which the decisions (mainly, whether to punish
or exclude opportunists) are made by each member separately, and the
network facilitates the exchange of information that identifies a member
as an opportunist.82 Clay modified this model patterned after merchant
coalitions in early nineteenth-century Mexican California to incorporate
76. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law, 23 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 26 (1980).
77. Id.
78. Landa, supra note 45, at 350.
79. It is worthwhile to note that the barriers to entry into an ethnic social group are generally
not directly related to network effects. The difficulty of joining such a group does not tend to have a
relationship to the size of the group but rather to its customs of recognizing kinship. Ethnic groups
rarely accept as kin people who are unrelated by blood or marriage, though, as Posner notes in his
article, supra note 76, at 26, this occasionally occurs. Since it is difficult to join a new ethnic group,
severing ties with one’s original ethnic group is harmful, especially in a society in which most
people do not deal with others who are not of their ethnic group.
80. See George Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful
Tales, 90 Q.J. ECON. 599, 608–11 (1976).
81. Greif, supra note 43, at 531–42.
82. Because the network-facilitated exchange of information on trustworthiness still leaves
decisions on how to react to this information to the individual merchants, this is an example of the
information mechanism which will be discussed infra Part III.B.1. If the network also coordinated
actions on the information (e.g., by having a committee make a decision binding on all members as
to who could be boycotted due to dishonesty), it would be an example of the exclusion mechanism.
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different strategies of specific merchants regarding dealing with people
who other members of the network tagged as “dishonest.”83 McMillan
and Woodruff point to the role of private-order organizations in
coordinating responses to opportunism.84
This Article classifies the mechanisms that networks use to mitigate
opportunism from a perspective of manipulation of network effects. Two
of these mechanisms, the information mechanism and the exclusion
mechanism, are refinements of elements the private-ordering literature
has observed—reputation and boycott/refusal to deal, respectively. The
Article also identifies two other mechanisms that are used by networks to
enforce norms—the control mechanism and the switching mechanism.
B. Mechanisms for Regulation by Networks
Network effects are the source of several comparative advantages
that networks possess in regulating compared to regulation by other
institutions. The mechanisms used by networks to enforce norms are also
used by nonnetwork regulators (e.g., in transaction regulation). However,
network effects make each of these mechanisms more effective.
Therefore, in situations where these mechanisms are effective in
enforcing norms, networks are likely to be a more effective regulator
than other potential regulators.
1. Information mechanism
The first of four norm-enforcement mechanisms employed by
networks is the information mechanism—collecting and disseminating
among members and nonmembers information mainly regarding the
credibility of firms that are members of the network. The information
mechanism facilitates independent decisions by firms, such as whether to
deal with a firm that the network reports as having acted
opportunistically. This mechanism complements the exclusion and
control mechanisms by expanding the scope of sanctions beyond
members of the network to nonmembers.85
The information mechanism is not unique to networks. Independent
firms invest in collecting information on potential business partners and
83. Clay, supra note 43.
84. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35. This role comes in addition to the role of
collecting information to detect opportunism.
85. The information mechanism also expands the scope of enforcement among the network
members to sanctions that are not imposed collectively by the network.
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may monitor their behavior. However, there are significant economies of
scale to monitoring transactions and collecting and verifying information
on trustworthiness,86 and private parties may have too small a transaction
volume at stake to justify extensive collection of information. Private
information collection firms, such as credit rating agencies, can exploit
these economies of scale just as well as networks by specializing in
monitoring and collecting information and selling the information to
many interested parties. Yet networks may have an advantage over
information collection firms regarding information on their members,
particularly when their control mechanism is effective. When members
transact mostly over the network’s transacting facilities, an ancillary
byproduct is that the network can monitor the transactions quickly and
accurately at a low cost. Even when a centralized transacting facility is
absent, networks may acquire information on members more cheaply
than outsiders. (For example, social networks usually lack a centralized
transacting facility, yet gossip on members is transmitted frequently.)
Networks not only have a cost advantage over other parties in
collecting and verifying information on members, but also greater
credibility in conveying this information to nonmembers. If a network
successfully induces nonmembers to join the network’s own decision to
exclude a member, it increases the magnitude of the sanction (and thus
the ability to enforce norms) by increasing the scope of people
sanctioning the excluded member.
2. Exclusion mechanism
A second mechanism that networks use to enforce norms is the
exclusion mechanism—denying the offending network member access to
the network, either permanently (expulsion) or temporarily (suspension).
Since network effects, when significant, grant considerable utility and
markedly decrease the cost of transacting, revoking a member’s access to
the network can be a serious sanction. Therefore, the network wields a
significant threat over its members in the form of exclusion from the
network.87 Exclusion is possible, of course, not only in network

86. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 600 (1984).
87. The use of suspension as a penalty, instead of exclusion, is sometimes preferred in order
to avoid an “endgame” situation in which the expelled party has nothing to lose once it acts
opportunistically in a certain instance. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 30, at 129.
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transactions but in bilateral transactions as well (e.g., Jane may refuse to
transact with John).
However, the exclusion mechanism is more effective when
employed by networks than by individual parties to the transaction
because a network coordinates the exclusion decision among all its
members. As mentioned above,88 coordination of anti-opportunism
measures enhances the effectiveness of these measures. A network is in
an excellent position to coordinate members’ sanctions and, through
exclusion, to deny the offending party the network benefits conferred by
the other members. In some industries, most business is conducted
through the network, and therefore exclusion from the network precludes
a firm from most potential transactions. In many industries, exclusion
from certain networks results in nonmembers’ refusal to deal with the
excluded firm.89 Hence, exclusion from a network may result in
exclusion from the entire line of business; this is a very powerful
sanction, rivaling the government’s in effectiveness.90 However,
exclusion may be ineffective when the severing of ties harms the
network more than the individual member; This Article will address such
situations below in the discussion of degradation.91
Besides denying the opportunistic member the network’s benefits,
exclusion also reduces the value of or eliminates the network-specific
investments that the member has made. The nature and value of these

88. See supra Part III.A.3 (citing McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35).
89. Nonmembers’ refusals to deal may be independent, due to viewing the expulsion as a
signal regarding the trustworthiness of the expelled member. Alternatively, nonmembers might have
undertaken an obligation to refuse to deal with persons expelled or otherwise sanctioned by the
network. Such obligations de facto expand the size of the network that is being regulated. An
example of such an obligation is a bylaw of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, requiring all
members to enforce arbitration judgments of other members. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note
30, at 121.
90. As Bernstein has noted,
In most industries . . . it is rarely necessary for a party to seek judicial enforcement of an
[arbitration] award. Merchant tribunals are able to place their own pressures on the
parties to comply promptly with their decisions. In the diamond industry, for example,
when a party does not comply with an arbitration award, every diamond bourse in the
world posts his picture along with a statement detailing his noncompliance. He may also
be suspended or expelled from the bourse that rendered the judgment and banned from
entering all bourses in the World Federation of Diamond Bourses. Being subject to these
types of sanctions makes it unlikely that a trader will be able to remain in the diamond
business.
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 30, at 109.
91. See infra Part III.C.2.
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investments varies from network to network. Investments may include
physical elements required to connect with the network (which may be
unsalvageable and useless if connection to the network is denied),
network-wide reputation, etc. Viewed from this perspective, the assets
over which a member surrenders control to the network are a form of
bond92 or “hostage.”93 An example is the charge of admission fees by
trade associations and their control over information they provide to their
members. Trade associations may confiscate these fees and other assets
over which the network has control as sanctions against a member’s
opportunistic behavior.94
3. Control mechanism
The control mechanism makes use of centralized control95 over
facilities required for transacting. Such centralized facilities include
electricity grids run by independent system operators, or the eBay servers
that process all transactions that are made through the online auction site.
In social networks, these facilities might be reputation or accrued
goodwill. In transportation networks, these might be terminals and
jointly-used tracks or roads. In exchanges, they are clearinghouses and
funds that are controlled by the network as their transfer is processed.
The primary effect of the control mechanism is preventative—
control over network facilities allows the network to better monitor
transactions for opportunism and possibly prevent or modify these
transactions. For example, transacting through internet auction websites
usually involves the use of centralized servers controlled by the operator
of the network. This control enables both monitoring by the operator for
opportunistic, usually fraudulent, behavior and prevention of transactions

92. See Kranton, supra note 18, at 214–17.
93. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983).
94. For example, such a mechanism exists in the cotton industry. See Bernstein, supra note
39, at 1737 n.69 (“In addition to paying the annual membership fee, members are required to
purchase a membership in the Exchange. The By-Laws provide that when a member fails to pay an
arbitration award, the prevailing party has a right to make a claim against his membership. If the
noncomplying party still refuses to pay, his membership is auctioned off and the award is paid from
the proceeds.”); id. at 1768 (“[W]hen a transactor is expelled from an association, he must forfeit his
membership fee as well as other tangible benefits of association membership such as price sheets,
technology circulars, and access to the group’s information services.”).
95. “Centralized control” means the ability of the network to either monitor or direct activity
over facilities used for transacting.
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that are likely to be fraudulent.96 As with the other enforcement
mechanisms, the control mechanism may, in certain cases, be employed
in bilateral transactions. The investment in creating an independent,
centralized transacting facility is typically large so such facilities are
rarely formed solely to regulate norm enforcement. Rather, they are
typically created to reduce the costs of transacting. An investment in a
centralized transacting facility is more economically feasible when the
transactions it facilitates are more complex (e.g., involving more parties)
and larger in aggregate volume. Because they involve transactions with
more parties, transactions on a network tend to be more complex than
bilateral transactions, and often the aggregate volume of transacting
tends to be larger in networks than in alternative bilateral transacting. As
a result, networks frequently have centralized transacting facilities that
can facilitate the control mechanism.
4. Switching mechanism
The switching mechanism is the replacement of a defaulted
transaction with an alternative one, with minimal loss of transactionspecific investment. A network is often able to mitigate the damage
caused by opportunistically defaulted transactions by quickly and
inexpensively finding an alternative to the defaulting party.97 The ability
to find an alternative transaction not only mitigates the damage from the
opportunistic default (by transferring some of the reliance investment in
the defaulted transaction to another transaction) but also deters some
types of opportunism that are based on renegotiating an agreement with
captive customers.
For example, John and Jane are dealers in premium widgets.
Premium widgets are very expensive luxury items, and only foolish
dealers deal with partners that lack an established reputation.
Furthermore, the size of the deal, and therefore the amount of risk a
default on it would pose to the injured party, depends on the degree to
which the other party’s reputation has been established. Therefore, deals
with new partners are initially small and grow as the partner’s reputation
is established. If no network (i.e., exchange) exists, John and Jane would

96. On the actions of internet auction sites to combat opportunism, see James M. Snyder,
Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or Could to Stop Online
Fraud?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 453, 460–62 (2000).
97. In the terms and context of the Uniform Commercial Code, this would be considered
“covering” for a breached transaction. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (2003).
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be sensible to concentrate their transactions with each other, building
their respective reputations and giving them the assurance required to
risk bigger and more profitable transactions. In fact, that is precisely
what they did, and John has dealt to date exclusively with Jane. Now,
having reached sizable and therefore both very risky and very profitable
transactions, Jane reneges on an agreement and offers to renegotiate it in
a manner much more favorable to her. She may find it profitable to do so
if she, unlike John, has alternative trading partners, or if the stakes in this
particular deal are so great as to dwarf her future expected gain from
dealing with John. John can either acquiesce to the renegotiated deal or
lick his wounds and begin trading with someone else, expending time
and foregone profits as he builds his reputation anew.
John could fare better if premium widgets were traded on the
Premium Widget Exchange, which, like many exchanges, has an
efficient switching mechanism. Reputation is exchange-wide, perhaps
because the exchange collects and reliably assesses each member’s past
behavior, and each exchange member consults with her potential
partner’s reputation record, which the exchange provides in order to
decide whether the potential partner is trustworthy enough for the size of
the deal contemplated.98 Upon Jane’s reneging on the agreement, John
could, if he were a member of the exchange, easily trade with another
exchange member, foiling Jane’s attempt to renegotiate. Other exchange
members would regard John’s reputation as established based on his
previous dealings with Jane, which were recorded and positively
assessed by the exchange. A distinction should be made between two
mechanisms that operated in this example: the information mechanism
supplied John’s potential trading partners with a credible account of
John’s reputation; the switching mechanism supplied John with access to
several alternatives to transacting with Jane so that upon Jane’s default
John could inexpensively find an alternative partner to the transaction.
Switching mechanisms are not unique to networks. A switching
mechanism has been found to deter opportunism and increase reliance in
bilateral relationships in nonnetwork environments.99 Absent elaborate
and accessible reputation-assessing and distributing systems, network
transactions may sometimes be more anonymous than bilateral
transactions. But when it is feasible for networks to construct such
98. An example of a similar exchange-wide reputation database is eBay’s feedback forum.
See http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2003).
99. See Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail
Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 271–73 (1984).
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systems, they have two advantages over other institutions in using the
switching mechanism. First, in network environments many investments
tend to be network-specific rather than transaction-specific, and therefore
they are salvageable through the switching mechanism. For example, the
switching mechanism allows partners who have established good
reputations to switch trading partners without the cost of reestablishing
reputation. The switching mechanism is not as effective in bilateral
trading as in a network environment because a trader’s reputation must
be reestablished each time she loses a partner, whereas in a network the
reputation is network-wide and need not be reestablished when
transacting with another network member.
Second, because networks usually reduce the cost of identifying
partners to a transaction, more alternative partners can be reached and
thus the transacting environment is more competitive. Contrast, for
example, discrete bilateral agreements to purchase a Pez dispenser with
purchasing the same Pez dispenser on eBay. The increased competition
and deeper market result in a smaller difference between the defaulted
transaction and the next-best alternative. For these two reasons, the
switching mechanism tends to be more effective in network
environments than in nonnetwork ones.
C. Opportunism in Network Environments
1. Breach
Most of the literature regarding private ordering addresses
opportunistic behavior that shares certain traits: (1) there is a large
benefit to the opportunistic party from defaulting on a specific
transaction; (2) there is a loss to the same party from potential future
transactions that are affected by the default on the specific transaction (or
at least a probability of such a loss depending on whether the
opportunistic behavior is detected); and (3) the benefit from defaulting
on the specific transaction outweighs the losses in future transactions.
This Article classifies opportunistic behavior having these characteristics
as “breach” in order to distinguish it from another type of opportunism,
“degradation,” which is described below.100 A typical example of breach
100. Despite the term’s implied relationship to breach in a contracts or torts context,
opportunistic behavior of the “breach” type need not involve a legal breach of duty or contract. Nor
does it require certainty of, or intent to, default. For example, this Article would consider insolvency
to be breach-type opportunism since the potentially insolvent party gains from the specific
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is failure to pay: the fraudulent party receives the good or service
provided to him without incurring its cost, thereby gaining its value. That
party loses future transactions—most likely all future transactions with
the party he cheated and possibly also transactions with others who have
heard of his actions. He may even lose future transactions with people
who do not suspect him specifically but have heard of the fraud and
cease to deal with unfamiliar parties due to the increased risk of fraud.
When a party chooses to defraud, it would be reasonable to assume that it
expects the gain from the specific transaction it defaults on to be greater
than the discounted aggregate loss of potential future transactions.
2. Degradation
Breach is not the only type of opportunistic behavior in network
environments. Another type of opportunism, which this Article calls
“degradation,”101 is unique to network environments. Degradation is a
predatory act that weakens the network, harming smaller firms more than
larger ones thereby giving larger firms an advantage over smaller
competitors. One might view degradation as a form of the strategy
known as raising rivals’ costs,102 adapted to prey on firms more
dependent on network effects than the degrading firm.103
The following example illustrates the goals and effects of
degradation: Goliath Corp. is a telephone company with a 70% market
share. Goliath makes modifications to the facilities connecting it with
other telephone companies so that any call between a customer of
Goliath and a customer of a competing company suffers from static
noise. Calls in which both parties are Goliath customers and calls in
which neither party is a Goliath customer are unaffected. Betty is a
customer of David Inc., a small competitor of Goliath. Approximately
70% of the people Betty calls are Goliath customers, correlating with
Goliath’s market share. This means that if she remains a customer of

transaction on which it defaulted, loses potential future transactions, and imposes losses on other
parties with regard to both the defaulted transaction and lost future transactions.
101. This Article follows the term used to describe the same type of behavior in Cremer, Rey
& Tirole, supra note 74, at 458.
102. On the strategy of raising rivals’ costs, see Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman,
Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983).
103. On degradation in nonnetwork contexts, see Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor,
Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript
on file with the author). An earlier, working-paper version of the article is available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=435600.
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David, 70% of her calls will suffer from static noise. If she switches from
David to Goliath, static noise will affect only 30% of her calls, those to
non-Goliath customers.
Betty is therefore likely to switch to Goliath. This is precisely the
reason Goliath adopted the degradation strategy. Though the quality of
its service suffers from the degradation—30% of its calls are of lower
quality than before—the degradation hurts the quality of the competitors’
services much more because 70% of their calls are affected. The
migration of customers to the larger network compensates Goliath for the
loss resulting from the reduced quality of its own service caused by the
degradation. This strategy is not merely a hypothetical possibility; such
strategies have been observed (or at least alleged), inter alia, in the credit
card industry,104 the internet backbone industry,105 and the telephone
industry.106
As the David and Goliath example demonstrates, degradation has
different characteristics than breach. One significant difference is that the
immediate payoff to a degrading party is often negative. For example,
when Goliath degraded connectivity with David, Goliath’s customers
(and indirectly, Goliath itself) were harmed by the static noise present in
30% of their phone calls. However, the act of degradation (Goliath’s
introduction of static noise in intercompany calls) raised all the network
members’ costs in transacting over the network or reduced all members’
benefits from transacting over the network, which amounts to the same
thing. Degradation therefore decreases aggregate network benefits, and
the defaulting party stands to gain from the decrease in the efficiency of

104. See Amitai Aviram, Accommodating a New Tenant in the House of Cards: Introducing
Competition into a Network Industry 24–25, 37–42 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the author).
105. See Cremer, Rey & Tirole, supra note 74, at 434, 457–60.
106. See, e.g., Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2000) (dealing
with customers of incumbent telephone company who allege, among other things, that incumbent
“has failed to provide interconnection between its network and those of competitors that is equal to
the interconnections it gives itself,” that incumbent’s competitors “have experienced undue delays
(presumably caused by Ameritech) in acquiring unbundled elements, and those delays have
precluded them from offering services as attractive as [the incumbent’s],” and that incumbent “has
continued to bill customers of competitors who have converted from Ameritech’s services, and
hence some customers are being double-billed, thereby harming the competitors’ good will”);
Cavalier Tel., LLC v. Verizon Va., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611–12, 14 (E.D. Va. 2002) (dealing
with entrant phone company alleging, among other things, that incumbent misrouted its calls,
provided inferior databases and web-based interfaces for ordering loops or last-mile facilities, made
the process of ordering last-mile facilities (which it controlled) “lengthy, complex, and expensive,”
and intentionally made the billing process for loops costly for its competitors).
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the network. Degradation may be feasible when one member of the
network is much larger than other members. The demand-side economies
of scale and scope, which characterize network environments, cause
access to larger networks to be more desirable than access to smaller
ones. Therefore, members of a large network are advantaged in
competing with members of smaller networks or with firms that are not
members of any network. In networks containing both larger and smaller
firms, the larger firms may gain from weakening the network and
competing with the smaller members in conditions closer to those that
would exist in the absence of a network.107 This can be done by
excluding others from the network108 or by degrading connectivity with
other members of the network.
When should we expect firms to degrade? In other words, when is
degradation a feasible strategy to a network member? Degradation is
likely to be a viable strategy only when the degrading firm cannot
withdraw from the network since withdrawal would be the equivalent of
absolute degradation—zero connectivity with the other former network
members. Barriers to withdrawal from the network could be due to legal
requirements (e.g., antitrust or regulatory mandates) or due to physical
impracticability. For example, railroad companies cannot completely cut
themselves out of a network, since the passengers could always walk
from one railroad’s terminal to another’s; however, railroad companies
can degrade by refusing to share terminal facilities or by refusing to sell
joint tickets, etc.109
Two nuances regarding a network member’s decision whether or not
to degrade should be noted. First, occasionally degradation is feasible
against some network members but not against others, such as where
reducing connectivity would harm the degrading firm less than some
network members but more than other network members. In that case,
107. In most cases, the degrading firm is limited to depriving the other network members of
the marginal network benefits attributable to the transactions contributed by the degrading firm.
Only in rare cases could a degrading firm deprive other network members from network effects they
confer on each other. In all other cases, victims of degradation still benefit from network effects
created collectively by them. Therefore, unless the degrading firm is the only significant participant
in the network, degradation usually cannot cause market conditions to be as if the network did not
exist at all.
108. See A. Douglas Melamed, Network Industries and Antitrust, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
147, 152–55 (1999).
109. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Denver & N.O.R. Co., 110 U.S. 667, 667, 4 S. Ct.
185, 186–87 (1884) (finding that Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad refused to “give or take
through bills of lading, or to sell or receive through tickets, or to check baggage over” the line of the
Denver & New Orleans Railroad).
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the degrading firm’s competitive position against the less vulnerable
firms would be weakened. The degrading firm would prefer selective
degradation against the more vulnerable firms while maintaining
efficient connectivity with the less vulnerable firms. Second, when the
degrader is less vulnerable to small degrees of degradation than its rivals,
but more vulnerable to greater degrees of degradation, degradation is
unlikely to occur if a degrader can be threatened with exclusion from the
network.
Network benefits are not necessarily directly proportional to the
amount of connectivity nor are they necessarily identical for all firms. It
is possible that by reducing connectivity slightly, the degrading firm will
harm itself less than its rivals, but upon a greater amount of degradation,
such as complete withdrawal from the network, the situation will reverse
and the harm to the degrading (withdrawing) firm will be greater than the
harm to the remaining network members. If this is the situation, a firm
may wish to degrade without withdrawing completely from the
network.110 However, when a high degree of degradation is harmful to
the degrading firm, the sanction of exclusion from the network may be
an effective deterrent (depending, among other things, upon the
network’s likelihood of detecting the degradation and responding by
excluding the degrading firm).
Degradation poses different challenges to regulation than breach.
One of the traits that makes degradation more difficult to regulate than
breach is the difficulty in detecting degradation. Regulating against both
breach and degradation poses a difficulty in observing the opportunistic
behavior and linking it to the opportunistic party (e.g., spotting the
burglar breaking into the house or proving that the static noise on the
phone line is the result of Goliath’s actions). But degradation is difficult
110. For example, suppose that in the David and Goliath hypothetical, the emergency services
(police, fire department, etc.) were David’s customers and that the customers would not switch
companies even if Goliath degraded connectivity. Goliath’s customers do not call those services
often; therefore, they remain Goliath’s customers even if Goliath introduces static to intercompany
phone calls. In other words, the customers prefer to be able to talk static-free in 70% of their calls
(yet have some static on the line in the rare event they call the police) over talking static-free in only
30% of their calls, including calls to emergency services. However, while having some static on the
line when they call police is acceptable to the customers, being unable to call the police at all is not.
Therefore, if Goliath further degrades by cutting out all contact with David customers, or if David
responds to the static noise degradation by cutting Goliath off, Goliath’s customers will leave
Goliath for David and other small rivals because they will prefer to have access to police in case of
emergency, even at the cost of not talking on the phone with 70% of their friends. Knowing this,
Goliath will not cut David off completely and may not degrade at all if it expects David to retaliate
by cutting it off.
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to identify even when the actual behavior is observed, since the “correct”
degree of connectivity is very difficult to determine.111 To a significant
extent, this is caused by poorly defined duties of connectivity. The ease
of detecting breach depends, at least inter alia, on clearly-defined
property and contractual rights with respect to the good or service in
question. For example, we may observe Ann’s default on an obligation to
Alice. It would be easy to identify whether this action is opportunistic
breach if clear rules determine whether Ann’s obligation is binding. The
laws of contract and property generally define rights to tangible property
more clearly than antitrust law defines rights to access another’s network
facilities; to use Carol Rose’s terms, contract and property law prefer (in
most but not all cases) “crystal” rules, while antitrust law prefers
“mud.”112
The looser definition of rights under antitrust law is not due to
neglect. It is difficult, particularly for an “outsider” such as a regulator or
the courts, to assess what the efficient degree of connectivity should be,
especially since the most efficient degree varies widely with the
peculiarities of each case. Imposing a duty of absolute connectivity
would be meaningless; connectivity could always be enhanced. Thus,
degradation might take the form of inaction or failure to upgrade
connectivity when efficient connectivity requires upgrading. It is
possible not to impose any duty of connectivity, and this policy would be
clearly defined, but such a rule would never prevent degradation even
where such a strategy is feasible to a specific firm and harmful to social
welfare.113 Lacking a clear guide, courts and regulators often use the
status quo as a benchmark and perceive decreases from that level of
connectivity as impermissible degradation.114 While there is some merit

111. This Article assumes that the “correct” level of connectivity is the one that maximizes
overall social welfare. While this is the mainstream presumption, it is by no means uncontested.
Even if this standard is agreed upon, determining the correct level of connectivity is not simple.
112. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577–78
(1988).
113. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 251–55 (demonstrating how an exclusion from a network
may prolong the existence of a monopoly and therefore be both feasible to the incumbent monopoly
and harmful to social welfare).
114. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
(condemning a firm’s refusal to sell joint tickets with a smaller rival after such joint tickets had been
sold for several years); cf. Little Rock & M.R. Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 41 F. 559, 564
(E.D. Ark. 1890), aff’d, 63 F. 775 (8th Cir. 1894). The St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern
Railroad used to connect at Little Rock, Arkansas with the Little Rock & Memphis Railroad. Upon
completing a track of its own to Memphis, SLIM&S Railroad refused to honor through tickets to
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to economizing on information costs by deferring to the presumed
efficiency of the status quo, this rule of thumb may be misleading,
especially in industries characterized by rapid change as many network
industries are. In such industries, change may affect the efficient level of
connectivity, and yesterday’s efficient level, which has been the status
quo, may be inefficient today. A connectivity benchmark based on the
status quo may punish firms that adjust their level of connectivity to such
changes.
While most networks primarily face either one type of opportunism
or the other, breach and degradation are not mutually exclusive. It is
theoretically possible that some markets would be susceptible to both
breach and degradation concerns.115 Furthermore, in several industries,
different aspects of the industry involve different opportunism types. For
example, the credit card industry is typically concerned with dishonor
(default on credit card payments) and fraud issues, both of which are of
the “breach” type.116 The very same industry, in countries having fewer
issuers and merchant acquirers, may be more concerned with larger
issuers employing a degradation strategy (e.g., slow and error-prone
processing of transactions between themselves and other issuers) to slow
the expansion of smaller competitors.117
3. Market structure and opportunism
Market structure, which is characterized, inter alia, by the number
and relative size of network members, significantly affects the type of
opportunistic behavior to which an industry is prone. Industries
Memphis using the LR&M Railroad and carried passengers to Memphis over its own lines instead.
The court declined to prohibit this action. Id.
115. As discussed infra Part III.C.3, the type of opportunism an industry is prone to suffer
from is significantly affected by the market structure of that industry. Industries with characteristics
that are conducive to both breach and degradation may be susceptible to both. For example, it is
possible to envision a market with one large firm and many small competitors. The large firm may
attempt to degrade against the smaller rivals, while the small firms may commit breach.
116. On fraud rates in credit card and debit card transactions, see Ronald J. Mann, Credit
Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1088–93, 1104–07
(2002). On MasterCard’s efforts to reduce fraud, see MASTERCARD INC., FORM 10-K FOR THE
FISCAL
YEAR
ENDED
DEC.
31,
2002,
16
(2003),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1141391/000095012303002592/0000950123-03-002592index.htm. Fraud is a breach-type of opportunistic behavior because the gain to the opportunistic
party from such behavior is derived from the benefits conferred directly on him or her (e.g.,
purchasing goods with a stolen credit card) rather than indirectly derived from the harm inflicted on
a rival as would be the case with degradation-type opportunism.
117. See Aviram, supra note 104, at 37–42.
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consisting of many small firms are likely to suffer from breach;
industries consisting of a small number of large firms and industries in
which firms have a high vulnerability variance, i.e., wide differentiation
in the expected harm to each firm from opportunistic behavior, are likely
to suffer from degradation.
The reason for the relationship between firm size and the type of
opportunistic behavior is rather straightforward. A breach decreases
connectivity by increasing the costs of transacting—including both the
losses caused by the breach and the costs expended by nonopportunistic
parties to protect themselves from or insure themselves against future
breach. Therefore, breach reduces aggregate network benefits. Small
network members who breach do not suffer as much from the reduction
in such benefits since the burden is divided among all members
according to their share of the transaction volume, while the payoff from
the fraud goes only to the breaching member. As for degradation, such a
strategy is usually only beneficial to larger firms. Smaller firms are likely
to be disadvantaged and possibly ineffective in employing a degradation
strategy, as they cannot effectively compete alone against larger firms
and they are not attractive for other firms to connect with.
The relationship between the vulnerability variance in an industry
and the risk of degradation stems from the driving motive for
degradation—raising the costs to one’s rival more than the rise in one’s
own costs in order to gain a competitive advantage over the rival.
Naturally, degradation is more profitable the greater the difference in
vulnerability between the degrading firm and its victim. When all firms
suffer the same harm from degradation, no firm will attempt to degrade,
since the degrading firm will not gain anything from it. As disparities in
vulnerability to degradation increase, so does the payoff from
degradation to the degrading firm. The greater the payoff, the more likely
and more frequently degradation will occur.
Market structure has an effect not only on the type of opportunistic
behavior to which the market is more susceptible but also on the ability
of a network to regulate conduct in order to mitigate opportunism. This
relationship will be explored below118 following a short examination of
how opportunism, both breach and degradation, affects social welfare.

118. See infra Part IV.C.
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4. Social welfare effects of opportunism in network environments
Breach and degradation may differ in their effects on social welfare.
Social welfare is an aggregate measurement of the well-being of all
individuals within society.119 An action that increases the well-being of
one or more individuals in society without decreasing the well-being of
any other members clearly increases social welfare. The assessment of
effects on social welfare becomes much more difficult when an action
increases the well-being of one individual at the same time it decreases
the well-being of another. Such assessment would require rules
governing the aggregation of individuals’ well-being, including
determining the relative weight each individual’s well-being receives;120
whether any of an individual’s preferences should not be considered in
the aggregate;121 and quantifying the diverse range of preferences that
affect one’s well-being.122 Reaching an actual number that measures the
social welfare is a difficult, if not impossible, task. The number of
abstractions and approximations needed to reach it would likely make
such a figure useless. However, it is much easier to reach rough
approximations regarding the effect of actions on social welfare, and
these approximations, while not exact, are easy to assess and can provide
important insights as to which actions are “better” in the sense of making
society as a whole better off.
This section will make such an approximation of the effects of
breach and degradation on social welfare. The risk of breach raises the
cost of transacting and therefore leads to a decrease in the number of
119. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961,
985 (2001). For a formal expression of social welfare, see id. at 985 n.42.
120. The utilitarian model of social welfare gives the same weight to each individual’s wellbeing. Some scholars object to this assumption by calling for preferential or even exclusive
consideration of the well-being of the worst-off individuals. For a concise discussion of views on
this matter, see id. at 987–88; David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute
Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 442–43 (2003).
121. For example, one may argue for or against including hateful preferences, such as wishing
someone else harm, in the calculus of social welfare. See Weisbach, supra note 120, at 442.
122. Quantifying preferences is difficult because many of them are nonpecuniary and in many
cases even the individual herself does not have precise values attached to her preferences. Despite
the difficulty, measuring only material preferences would significantly reduce the value of a social
welfare calculus by making it less connected to an individual’s actual well-being. See, e.g., Richard
A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“The non-pecuniary dimension of
wealth is important to emphasize, especially to non-economists, who are prone to assume that
economists care only about goods and services that are priced in the market. Yet I concede the
incompleteness of ‘wealth,’ even when so broadly defined, as a measure of social welfare.”).
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beneficial transactions that take place. To illustrate, think of the reactions
of people who trade on eBay when they learn of a surge in instances of
fraud on the network. Individuals who are more risk-averse may stop
trading on eBay. This would reduce utility not only for them, but also for
the remaining traders who lose potential trading partners. Furthermore,
parties to the remaining transactions may take action to decrease the risk
of breach, and the cost of these actions further decreases social welfare.
In the eBay example, the individuals who still trade on eBay may require
payment by credit card, ask for collateral, or run extensive checks on
their trading partners, all of which bear a cost.
Complete prevention of breach may result in the enforcement of
some inefficient deals since, if the network is successful in preventing all
breaches, a member might not be able to “buy” its way out of an
inefficient deal. However, there is good reason to believe that the
regulator will be able to identify and allow efficient breaches.123 Also,
due to the degree of reliance on deals in a network (which increases the
social cost of breach), efficient breaches are likely to be uncommon in
comparison with inefficient breaches.124 Furthermore, a firm that
repeatedly finds itself committed to inefficient deals can opt out of the
network.
Assessment of the effects of degradation on social welfare is
different. Degradation lowers the utility of interconnection or imposes
123. The regulator may require a portion of the gain from the efficient breach in order to allow
it. It would, however, be in its interest not to demand a portion so large as to induce the firm not to
commit efficient breach.
124. The following fact pattern illustrates why greater reliance reduces the likelihood of
efficient breach. Alice and Ben sign a contract by which Alice will sell Ben her house for $100,000.
This contract is good for both because Alice needs to relocate and therefore currently derives only
$80,000 from the house, while Ben would receive $120,000 of utility from the house if he owned it.
Before they close the deal, Carol persuades Alice to breach the contract with Ben and sell the house
to her (Carol) for $130,000. This is good for both Alice and Carol. Alice receives $30,000 more than
she would under the contract with Ben and Carol likes the neighborhood more than Ben does and
would derive $150,000 of utility from the house if she owned it. The total utility under the Alice-Ben
contract is $40,000. Alice gets $100,000 in return for an asset she values at $80,000, and Ben gets an
asset he values at $120,000 in return for $100,000. The utility under the Alice-Carol contract is
$70,000. Alice gets $130,000 for an asset she values at $80,000, and Carol gets an asset she values at
$150,000 in return for $130,000. Therefore, if neither Alice nor Ben relied on the original contract,
then the breach may be efficient. But suppose Ben, in reliance on the contract, sold his previous
home, left his old job in favor of a job closer to the home he thought he was buying, and made other
changes that will cause him a loss of $50,000 if he does not receive the house. In that case we must
deduct $50,000 from the total utility under the Alice-Carol contract, bringing the total benefit down
to $20,000, which is less than the $40,000 to be gained from the Alice-Ben contract. Therefore, the
greater the parties’ reliance on the Alice-Ben contract, the more likely a breach thereof would be
inefficient.
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costs on it, thereby decreasing network benefits. This reduced utility or
added cost leads to a decrease in the number of beneficial transactions
that take place on the network. This results in a loss, not only to the
parties that no longer find a transaction gainful after the added risk of
degradation, but also to all network members who share in the loss of
network benefits due to the decrease in transacting over the network. The
added risk of degradation and the decrease in network benefits may
cause some members to cease transacting through the network, perhaps
seeking relative advantage by creating an alternative network in which
members do not degrade or perhaps withdrawing from the market
altogether because their small size does not enable them to compete. This
reduction of transactions over the network further decreases network
benefits and, if it results in less competition, also increases the
deadweight loss.125 All of these effects reduce social welfare.
Not every unilateral reduction in connectivity is degradation. Some
actions that reduce connectivity do not reduce net social welfare and are
not a form of degradation. Added connectivity is not always welfareenhancing. Like supply-side economies of scale, network effects may
peak at a certain level. Above that level, more connectivity may reduce
social welfare for reasons such as the cost of the added complexity.
Therefore, connectivity above the maximum efficient scale of the
network may be welfare-reducing even if it is costless to enforce.
Furthermore, preventing a reduction in connectivity has costs as well. A
prohibition of any reduction in connectivity is akin to an open-access
requirement. Like open-access mandates, a limitation on the ability to
reduce connectivity decreases the incentive of network members to
invest in growing since the open access allows competitors to free ride
on their success. As a result, incentives to compete among network
members decline.126 Another concern with prohibiting degradation is
that to make such a prohibition meaningful, someone needs to prescribe
what the “right” level of connectivity is, from which a decrease would be

125. The deadweight loss is a loss of social welfare resulting from the use of market power to
restrict output and raise prices. A deadweight loss increases as competition decreases. On
deadweight loss created by reduced competition, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §1.3b (1994).
126. See Little Rock & M.R. Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 41 F. 559, 564 (E.D. Ark.
1890) (“Competing lines afford the best and surest protection the public can have against oppressive
rates . . . . Is it, under these circumstances, an unfair or unjust preference or discrimination for the
defendant, in the sale of tickets, to prefer its own line to that of the plaintiff? If it is, the incentive to
the construction of competing lines will be very much lessened.”).
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considered degradation. As discussed above,127 the study and constant
monitoring needed to assess the “correct” level are very costly, and, as
with all forms of price or access pricing regulation, it is subject to a
significant risk of error and to wasteful expenditures of resources on
influencing the regulator.
Can government rely on the quality of connectivity prescribed by the
network and lend its enforcement mechanisms to impose those
standards? This depends on whether networks treat welfare-reducing
degradation differently than welfare-enhancing reductions in
connectivity. At the time the alleged degradation takes place, the network
is likely to condemn any reduction in connectivity regardless of its
effects on social welfare, just as it does not distinguish between cheating
a partner to a transaction and cheating a cartel. Both formally seem to be
“breach,” though the latter is welfare-enhancing and therefore not viewed
as opportunism. However, at the time of forming the network and
determining the duties of its members, networks are likely to determine
an efficient level of connectivity, i.e., allow “efficient degradation”
which is not degradation at all. There would still be a problem when
changing circumstances modified the efficient level of connectivity.
Absent government intervention, the network might renegotiate its
obligations. But when private sanctions are ineffective, lack of
government intervention would allow the large firm to degrade.
Therefore, independent government assessment of the “correct” level of
connectivity should be appropriate where (1) the network is an inefficient
regulator against degradation either because it lacks the ability or the
incentive to prohibit degradation; (2) circumstances have changed since
the formation of the network so that the efficient level of connectivity
has changed; and (3) analysis of the practice that allegedly amounts to
degradation indicates that it reduces social welfare.
IV. NETWORKS AS EFFICIENT REGULATORS
A. Comparing Regulators
Part II.B of this Article discussed the various potential regulators and
assessed the advantages and disadvantages of each. After discussing
network effects and the enforcement mechanisms that utilize them, one
can better assess some advantages networks possess in regulating. This

127. See supra Part III.C.2.
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section will focus on networks’ ability to prevent some norm violations,
and on networks’ ability to form and employ a common culture to reduce
the costs of enforcing norms.
1. Overview of potential regulators
As mentioned above,128 several entities may act as regulators: firstparty regulators (self-regulation), second-party regulators (transaction
regulation), network regulators, and government regulators. Selfregulation assigns the role of regulator to the entity with both the greatest
ability to detect and prevent opportunistic behavior as well as the least
incentive to regulate. Self-regulation is also highly susceptible to selfdeception and discrepancies in culture and personal morality.
Transaction regulation benefits from the familiarity of the parties with
the regulated transaction and their ability to monitor it closely, but
suffers from weak sanctions against offending parties. At the other end of
the spectrum, furthest away from opportunistic behavior, is government
regulation, which benefits from relatively powerful sanctions but which
entails significant monitoring costs as well as significant costs of error.
Network regulation is an alternative to self-regulation, transaction
regulation, and government regulation. Networks often have a
monitoring ability comparable to or surpassing that of the parties to the
transaction. Networks’ strongest sanction—exclusion from the
network—may be a greater deterrent than governmental sanctions. This
is especially true where law enforcement is lacking or the threat of
imprisonment is insignificant.129
2. Networks’ ability to prevent norm violation
One advantage network regulation can have over its government
counterpart is the ability to prevent some forms of opportunistic actions
rather than prohibit and punish as the government does. The control
mechanism in some cases enables the network to intercept and block
transactions that are deemed unwanted. For example, eBay can delete
listings of illegal items from its website. In addition to deterring
opportunistic behavior, the switching mechanism can also prevent such
behavior by preventing would-be victims from becoming captive to an
opportunistic party. The exclusion mechanism, while punishing and

128. See supra Part II.B.
129. See supra note 25.
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deterring, also prevents opportunists from trading opportunistically in the
future in industries where most trading is done on an exchange.130
Government’s arsenal of sanctions includes fines, injunctions, and
incarceration. Fines deter and punish but do not prevent the harmful
behavior. Neither does injunctive relief, since it does not physically
prevent the harmful behavior but merely attaches a punishment
thereto.131 The only preventive remedy the government has is
incarceration, which not only punishes and deters but also physically
prevents the opportunistic party from violating most norms while
incarcerated. However, as mentioned above, incarceration is likely to be
imposed upon only the most egregious norm violators.
Forms of regulation that physically prevent a would-be opportunist
from acting in a harmful way rather than deterring or punishing such
behavior can be analogized to rules of physics, which, unlike rules of
law, cannot be broken.132 The possession of such “rules of physics”
gives networks a significant advantage over other potential regulators.
Like rules of physics, however, these mechanisms are difficult to
artificially create—they will not exist if efficient market structure
dictates that a given network does not have the ability to track and block
transactions or if many transactions in a given industry are done outside
of networks. In contrast to rules of physics, rules of law are easier to
artificially impose where they did not exist before.
3. Networks and common culture
Another advantage that some networks possess is a common culture
shared by members. Common culture reduces costs involved in
regulation in several ways. Since it creates a sense of belonging, it
130. For example, if John habitually defrauds his transacting partners, the exclusion
mechanism would first serve to deter him from doing so as he recognizes that getting caught and
excluded would impose serious costs on him. But if deterrence fails and John commits fraud, his
exclusion from the network would prevent him from harming other network members.
131. An injunction is a threat of court sanction if the court’s order is violated. As such,
additional enforcement costs are required to enforce the injunction (e.g., detection of the violation,
proving the violation in contempt proceedings, etc.). Even then, to prevent a given conduct the
penalty must either be incarceration (because fines would merely put a price tag on the violation) or
it must be targeted not at the violator but at a private entity that has the ability to physically prevent
the violator’s conduct (e.g., requiring eBay to delete listings of illegal items). The former alternative
is unlikely—one who violates an injunction but who does not pose a physical threat is rarely
incarcerated. The latter merely commandeers network regulation.
132. For an extensive discussion of regulation through “rules of law” and “rules of physics,”
see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 85-89 (1999) (using the term
“architecture” to regard the various “rules of physics” methods of regulation).
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widens the scope of services provided by the network to include social
gratification. Therefore, the deterrence effect of exclusion from the
network is greater because exclusion entails not only loss of business
with network members, but also loss of social standing. Common culture
also provides members with knowledge about matters relevant to the
business transacted over the network and standardizes this knowledge
among the network members, thus reducing information asymmetry.
Further, a common culture creates a unique good—esteem or social
standing in the group—which can be a powerful motivator to follow the
norms of the group.133 Common culture may also add a psychological
element to the enforcement of norms because a violation of the norms of
one’s social group with which one empathizes or identifies may be
perceived by oneself and by others as more morally wrong than violating
the norms of more distant peoples or groups. Moreover, membership in a
network may induce a sense of kinship that would increase the guilt
associated with violating a norm that harms one’s “kin,” and may
eliminate the ability to justify norm violation with an antipathy to
“outsiders.”134 For all these reasons, common culture reduces the cost of
enforcing norms.
It is therefore unsurprising that networks and other institutions have
attempted to create common cultures that facilitate the underlying
business transactions.135 Part of the value in belonging to a common
culture, however, is the difficulty in artificially producing it. The
difficulty in finding or creating an alternative, equally attractive social
group is what makes membership in the current group so valuable. It is
difficult to create a common culture where there was none before, but if

133. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
134. On guilt alleviation as an incentive to cooperate and reciprocate good behavior, see Lior
Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the FileSwapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 563–67 (2003).
135. See, e.g., Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 30, at 110 (“[Trade
associations] have also encouraged the emergence of informal information channels by creating
opportunities for social interaction among members and their families. Many associations sponsor
clubs for spouses and host regular sporting events and gala dinners. . . . They also link social
reputation to commercial reputation, thereby increasing the cost to transactors of sacrificing
reputation bonds and giving them stronger incentives to abide by their commercial commitments.”);
Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 30, at 130 (“Another enforcement mechanism sometimes invoked
by the arbitrators is a proceeding in Jewish rabbinical courts against the party who refuses to
comply. Because these courts have the authority to ban an individual from participation in the Jewish
community, this is a powerful threat against Orthodox members of the diamond industry.”); see also
Landa, supra note 45.
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an existing cultural network exists it may expand its role and act to
mitigate opportunism in business transactions, exploiting its enhanced
ability to regulate.136 As addressed in the next section, when networks
have the ability to be the efficient regulators, they often reform to accept
that role.
B. When Are Networks Optimal Regulators?
Below I will discuss when networks are the optimal regulators. This
depends on the network having comparative advantages in both the
ability to regulate and in the incentive to do so. When this is not the case,
other potential regulators are likely to displace the network unless the
network adapts to improve its ability and/or incentive. This adaptive
qualification will be addressed at the end of this section.
1. Networks’ ability to regulate
The mechanisms that networks use to regulate—the switching
mechanism, the exclusion mechanism, the control mechanism, and the
information mechanism—were described above. The effectiveness of
these mechanisms, and therefore the effectiveness of the network as a
regulator, is dependent on the market structure.
The effectiveness of a network’s switching mechanism is greater in
markets that are characterized by significant network benefits and low
concentration. As concentration rises, the market becomes more
susceptible to collusion; the network’s prices are less likely to mimic a
perfectly competitive market, and fewer alternative firms are available to
contract with when a transaction fails.
Similarly, the effectiveness of a network’s exclusion mechanism is
greater in markets that are characterized by significant network benefits
and low concentration. The greater the network benefits, the greater the
value conferred on the network member, and therefore the greater the
cost of canceling the membership in the network.137

136. See Aviram, supra note 9.
137. For a similar point, see Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 30, at 111
(“When market transactors share a common view about what constitutes acceptable business
behaviour, a given instance of misbehaviour will result in more transactors imposing the
sanction. . . . It gives transactors an added incentive to abide by their commercial commitments by
making it in each transactor’s individual best-interest to perform rather than breach over a wide
range of contingencies and market conditions.”).
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Larger firms, however, are less threatened by exclusion. First, the
larger the firm the greater the loss to the network from its exclusion since
the size of the network decreases significantly and with it the network
benefits. The network’s threat of exclusion is less credible the greater the
loss it suffers from the exclusion. Second, some firms may be large
enough to become indispensable to other firms, and therefore exclusion
from the network may force those dependent members to contract with
the excluded firm. This decreases both the volume of transactions
processed through the network (thereby further harming network
members) and the amount of business the excluded firm is deprived of.
Third, as mentioned above,138 large firms may actually find it profitable
to adopt a degradation strategy under which the firm weakens the
network in order to gain an advantage in competing against smaller
firms. Exclusion from the network is the ultimate form of degradation
since it degrades to nothing the connectivity with the excluded firm and
therefore would be a boon, not a bane, to large firms that benefit from
degradation.139
The information mechanism is an extension of the exclusion
mechanism and decreases in effectiveness in similar situations: private
parties are less likely to boycott larger firms, even if provided with
credible information by the network, because the harm from boycotting a
larger firm tends to be greater. Specifically, large firms tend to have
more captive partners who find it very costly to switch away from the
large firm and are therefore less likely to do so.
Finally, the control mechanism is also more efficient in markets that
are characterized by significant network benefits and low
concentration.140 The control mechanism is effective when the network’s
transacting facilities cannot be feasibly replaced by opportunistic
members. If the transacting facilities can be easily replaced, then the
opportunistic members can do so immediately before behaving

138. See Cremer, Rey & Tirole, supra note 74 and Part III.C.2.
139. Some large firms do not benefit from degradation because network benefits gained from
operating within the network outweigh the possible benefits of competing against a degraded
network. For such firms, the third argument regarding the effectiveness of the exclusion mechanism
would not apply, and perhaps the threat of exclusion will deter them from breach. However, the
other two arguments (regarding the credibility of the threat to exclude and the “stranded partners”
that cannot stop transacting with the firm) still apply and may weaken the network’s ability to
discipline that firm’s behavior.
140. Some networks have a decentralized structure that does not involve centralized control of
transacting facilities. In that case, the control mechanism will not be available regardless of network
benefits or the size of firms in the market.
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opportunistically (to evade the network’s ability to monitor and prevent
the behavior) or immediately after behaving opportunistically (to null the
effect of the network’s denial of access to the facilities). Creating
independent transacting facilities has the same effect as being excluded
from the network, and therefore the effects of network benefits and firm
size on the effectiveness of the control mechanism are the same as those
mentioned in the discussion above on the exclusion mechanism. The
greater the network benefits conferred by the network, the larger the
difference between it and any alternative facility created by the
opportunistic member. In sum, networks’ ability to regulate should
increase as network benefits rise and the size of the firms in the market
decreases.
2. Networks’ incentive to regulate
Opportunism, broadly defined, is “an act in which someone destroys
part of the cooperative surplus to secure a larger share of it.”141
Regulation is aimed at mitigating opportunism, yet no potential regulator
has the incentives to always deter opportunism. First-party controllers
(self-regulators) have perhaps the least incentive to regulate efficiently
since the regulator is also the would-be opportunist and is likely to be the
direct beneficiary of the opportunistic behavior it is regulating. Secondparty controllers (transaction regulators) are directly affected by any
opportunism targeted at them but do not care about the effects on others.
Therefore, they do not have a sufficient incentive to regulate efficiently
when opportunism imposes externalities on others. They may even
regulate in a way that benefits them but harms others, as may be the case
with cartels, group boycotts, etc. Government has broader incentives,
usually extending to the interests of all its constituents. However, the
incentives are indirect. As public-choice theory observes, the interests of
certain constituents influence government more than others. Government
may also have other interests besides mitigating opportunism that might
conflict with efficient anti-opportunism enforcement.142

141. Cooter, supra note 12, at 150.
142. For example, as mentioned supra note 25, the government’s interest in deterring violent
crimes and the need to assign sanctions in proportion with their gravity require that government not
use its most powerful sanctions against persons who act opportunistically in business transactions
since this is considered a significantly less serious crime than murder or rape. If private parties can
rely on the government to deter the more serious crimes, private parties will impose the strongest
sanctions they have against less serious, but still harmful, behavior such as opportunism in business
transactions.
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Networks have similar incentives to those of the parties to the
transaction. Being a larger group, the array of interests networks are
concerned with is broader than that of transaction regulators. Unlike the
government, the network is directly affected by opportunism, since
opportunism usually decreases network benefits and reduces activity and
reliance on the network. Like transaction regulators, networks may
disregard, or even exploit, the interests of nonmembers. The literature
has termed this “the dark side of private ordering.”143 For example, some
networks discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, or other
characteristics. In certain cases (typically where government regulation is
lacking), networks utilize physical violence as a sanction.144 More
commonly, they may attempt to create, enhance, or maintain the market
power of their members.
The possession of market power by a network, or the ability to
maintain that market power, significantly biases the network’s
incentives. The same mechanisms that are used to mitigate opportunism
can be used to facilitate collusion. From the perspective of the network
members, but not, of course, from the perspective of overall social
welfare, cheating on a cartel agreement is no different from defrauding.
Both reduce the benefits to network members, and the prevention of both
is beneficial to the network.
Stephen Pirrong points to other potential biases that may cause
networks to lack the incentive to regulate in a socially efficient
manner.145 First, collective-action problems and rent-seeking among
network members impair incentives to self-regulate.146 Second, some
types of opportunism mainly affect inframarginal customers of the
network, while the network members’ wealth depends on the marginal
customers.147 The strength of these arguments seems to be highly
143. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 35. Other scholars refer to this as the “downside” of
private ordering. See Ellen D. Katz, Private Order and Public Institutions, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2481,
2482–85 (2000); McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 35, at 2454–58.
144. Milhaupt & West, supra note 35, at 93 (“[I]n the absence of workable legal mechanisms,
enforcement requires credible threats of physical violence: state coercion must be privatized.”).
145. Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of
Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 150–64 (1995).
146. Id. at 157–64.
147. Pirrong makes two other arguments as well: (1) networks may not face significant
competition and therefore may lack the incentive to improve efficiency in transacting through the
network, id. at 154–55; and (2) there is a significant negative externality on nonmembers who rely
on price information from transactions on the network, id. at 151–54. Both of these arguments suffer
from flaws.
The argument regarding lack of competition among networks is unconvincing because even if
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dependent on the characteristics of the specific network. Pirrong’s focus,
for example, was on commodity exchanges. Even in instances where
such arguments have validity, this only means that networks are
imperfect regulators. As seen above, the government—as well as any
other potential regulator—suffers from imperfections in its incentives
and ability to regulate. Networks may therefore be the most efficient
regulators even where they suffer from some bias in their incentives.
Furthermore, as described below,148 networks adapt to biases that
hinder regulation by evolving through middleware into a network with
either decentralized control or centralized control by a firm that does not
possess market power either alone or with others in the network.149
Typically, this is because the “hub” firm that controls the expanded
network does not operate in the industry in which the market-powerpossessing members operate—for example, an express company in the
hub of a network of railroads or a programming language in the hub of a
network of operating systems, etc.150

a network faces no competition it would still view opportunism that harms its customers as a cost
rather than a monopolistic rent (unless it profits the network itself, which would make the
“opportunistic” action an exploitation of market power by the network rather than an opportunistic
act done over the network). If opportunism is a cost, a monopolist would have an incentive to
mitigate it and replace it with outright extraction of monopolistic rent as long as the cost of
mitigation is lower than the loss of profits from the decline in demand due to this cost. However, one
instance in which this would not be the case is where the network is regulated by government and
limited in its ability to receive payments from its customers. In that case the monopolist would have
no incentive to diminish opportunism. Furthermore, in the case of such regulation, to the degree that
this opportunism is beneficial to the network members, the network might favor opportunism as a
form of “gold plating” evasion of regulatory caps on rent extraction. But this seems not to be the
common case with most networks.
Regarding the reliance on price information, nonmembers should, and probably do, take into
account the degree of opportunism policing when they decide whether and to what extent to rely on
the network or the information it generates. If a network is the institution with the best ability to
mitigate opportunism but lacks the incentive to self-regulate efficiently, nonmembers will seek a
more accurate indicator, rely less on the price information, or pay the network in order to selfregulate.
148. See infra Part IV.B.3.
149. The network possessing market power may attempt to prevent middleware from forming
or from connecting to the network since the network benefits more from maintaining its market
power than from enhancing regulation.
150. Perhaps the popularity of industry-sponsored networks in some industries, and of
independent networks in other industries, may be explained by the need (in the latter group of
industries) to create a network that is free of market power bias in the incentive to regulate. This
issue may warrant significant additional attention that exceeds the scope of this Article.

1228

AVI-FIN--NAME FIXED.DOC

1179]

2/18/2004 1:26:36 PM

Regulation by Networks

3. Networks’ resilience: the role of middleware in making networks
better regulators
As noted above,151 there is a demand for efficient regulation. This
demand allows networks to displace other institutions, such as the parties
to the transaction or government, where the network is the more efficient
regulator. Similarly, when networks are not efficient regulators, demand
for regulation creates pressures to replace the ineffective network with
other institutions. However, networks are very resilient and, in response
to a demand for regulation, often adapt to a form that is better suited to
mitigate opportunism.
This adaptation often takes the form of an institution recent antitrust
case law and literature has called “middleware.”152 Middleware is a
facility that connects two independent networks in order to maintain
access between those networks. It can be analogized to a hub, the spokes
of which are independent networks and the purpose of which is to
combine the independent spokes into a single network.
Middleware has been discussed in depth in the context of the
Microsoft trial.153 In that context, the middleware was software (such as
Sun’s Java and Netscape’s Navigator) that could operate on various
operating systems while allowing application developers to develop
applications operating thereon. An application written for the
middleware would then operate on any of the various operating systems
that supported the middleware. Thus, the middleware would connect
independent networks or operating systems, allowing one application to
operate on all.
Much of the discussion in the Microsoft trial and in the literature that
analyzed middleware in the aftermath of that trial examined the effects of
middleware on market power and market definition. Market power may
be a cause of the demand for middleware because it biases the existing
network’s incentive to regulate efficiently. For example, software
application programmers may create a demand for middleware such as
Java out of concern that if their software application cannot be used on
several operating systems, Microsoft would extract the surplus value they

151. See supra Part II.A.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d in
part, 253 F.3d 34, 53–54 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); Howard A. Shelanski
& J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2001).
153. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
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create by raising the price of its operating system.154 But there may be
other reasons for the emergence of middleware, such as limitations to the
current networks’ ability—rather than incentive—to regulate. A key
utility of middleware is its ability to ensure efficient connectivity
between formerly independent networks.155
It seems that one of the benefits of the middleware discussed in the
Microsoft trial, though certainly not the only benefit and perhaps not the
most important one, was its ability to allow a single application to
operate on several operating systems.156 Arguably, the market power
possessed by Microsoft’s Windows operating system biased its incentive
to regulate efficiently, perhaps instead giving it an incentive to attempt to
maintain or enhance its market power by excluding or degrading. On the
other hand, middleware such as Java or Netscape Navigator did not
possess market power and therefore had an unbiased incentive to enforce
norms efficiently (“norms” in this context may perhaps mean choice of
efficient technical standards rather than technical standards that are
suboptimal but which exclude rivals).
Middleware may also emerge when existing networks lack the ability
to properly regulate. This seems to have been the case, for example, with
an older type of middleware—express companies.157 These companies
formed in the mid-nineteenth century when traveling a significant
distance by train required connecting through many small railroads. A
small number of railroads operated in each region, making a regional
network less effective as a regulator.158 Express companies took upon
154. If the software application can be used on several operating systems, Microsoft cannot
extract the surplus value because if it raised the price of Windows, people would use the application
on another operating system. For example, if a new financial planning program was worth $100
more to every user than the next-best software of the same type and that financial planning program
only worked on Windows, Microsoft could raise the price of Windows by $100 and users would still
buy it since users would require Windows in order to benefit from the financial planning software.
If, on the other hand, the financial planning software was written in Java and could be used on
Windows as well as other operating systems, a $100 price increase in Windows would cause users to
abandon Windows and use the financial planning software on another operating system. The
application software writer could then raise the price of the application to capture the surplus value it
has created.
155. Middleware often has other functional utilities that have nothing to do with regulation.
For example, the internet browser serves as an interface between the user and the internet.
156. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 34, 53 (explaining how middleware allows an application to
operate on several operating systems and discussing the potential competitive significance).
157. See Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms,
with Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 446, 454–60 (1983).
158. As discussed supra Part IV.B.1, high concentration (i.e., a market composed of a few
large firms) reduces a network’s ability to regulate. It is noteworthy that there was another obstacle
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themselves to deliver freight and coordinated among the railroads that
carried that freight. As Dennis Carlton and Mark Klamer point out,
express companies offered this coordination until railroad companies
consolidated and were able to offer comparable coordination.159
The resilience of networks is not without limits. As discussed
above,160 network effects may to some extent raise barriers to entry,
meaning some “biased” networks would not be replaced by smaller
unbiased alternatives. However, even if proponents of inefficient lock-in
are correct in their analysis, the barriers to entry raised by network
effects are not infinite, and therefore biased networks’ fear of being
replaced by nonbiased alternatives serves as a check on the degree to
which they use their ability to regulate in a manner that is socially
inefficient.161 Another limit to the resilience of networks stems from the
evolutionary pattern by which they develop. The creation of PLSs is
often not spontaneous but rather develops in phases; initially the PLS
regulates very few, cooperative (and therefore easy to enforce) functions,
and only later does the PLS expand to enforce more rivalrous norms.162
Impediments to the creation of PLSs may slow the entry of network
regulators and this delay, if it is sufficiently long, may force parties to
enter into transaction regulation, including horizontal and vertical
to self-coordination by the railroads due to a possible bias in incentives caused by possession of
market power. There were not many railroads competing from any given destination, and therefore
many of the railroad companies possessed some market power.
159. Carlton & Klamer, supra note 157, at 457 (“Some of the uniform operating procedures
were spurred by outside competition. During the thirty-year period beginning in 1850, independent
freight companies, such as Wells Fargo, began to serve as intermediaries between railroads and
customers who desired to ship goods. These freight companies handled the complicated transactions
with all the different railroads. . . . By the 1880’s, the railroads had little need for freight express
companies.”). On consolidation as a response to the need for greater coordination, see ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 81–
82, 89 (1977).
160. See supra note 68.
161. For example, even if network effects benefiting users of Microsoft Windows would allow
Microsoft to design its operating system in a way that is suboptimal to the consumers but that
suppresses the emergence of middleware and competing operating systems, there are limits to the
disutility Microsoft could inflict. At some point, the disutility of the design would more than offset
the utility of Windows’s network effects for some marginal users, and they would abandon Windows
for a rival. This, in turn, would reduce Windows’s network effects, making other users decide to
switch operating systems, which would reduce network effects yet again, ultimately resulting in the
market tipping to another network. Similarly, a social network might adopt norms that are inefficient
but exclude a certain group to the advantage of the network’s members. But if the norm is grossly
inefficient, another group would form with more efficient norms and would be able to recruit
members despite its disadvantage in network effects, due to the greater efficiency of its norms.
162. See Aviram, supra note 9.
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integration that affects market structure. For example, excessively strict
antitrust regulation may prohibit welfare-enhancing information
exchanges or trade association rules that reduce opportunism.
It is also important to note that middleware is not necessarily
welfare-enhancing. For example, it may free ride on investments in the
independent networks it connects. However, where network regulation
can be efficient, but the existing network lacks the incentive or ability to
regulate efficiently, middleware is likely to appear in response to demand
for welfare-enhancing regulation.
It is worthwhile to observe the dual effect that middleware has on a
network’s ability to regulate. On one hand, as discussed at length above,
middleware has the effect of strengthening the network’s incentive to
regulate efficiently. Since the incumbent network is threatened by entry
or expansion of middleware if it does not regulate efficiently, it is either
“kept honest” by the middleware or displaced by it. On the other hand,
middleware weakens the network’s ability to regulate as it undermines
the exclusion mechanism; exclusion from the network does not deprive a
member of network benefits since the middleware provides them. The
control mechanism is also often undermined; tracking behavior on the
network’s central facilities is not helpful if the central facility can be
bypassed by using the middleware, especially if the middleware is more
lenient in its enforcement or if the middleware abides by and enforces
different norms. This dual effect makes it impossible to assess as a
general matter whether middleware increases or reduces the ability of
networks to regulate in a social-welfare-maximizing manner.
C. Market Structure and Regulation
As mentioned above, this Article offers but an initial observation,
intended to guide future detailed empirical examination of the utilization
of network effects in creating institutions that mitigate opportunism. This
section takes a first step on this empirical journey with a glance at
anecdotal evidence that supports the predictions of the theory espoused
in this Article.
Part III.C of this Article explained why markets with low
concentration—i.e., containing many small firms—are prone to suffer
from the breach type of opportunism, while markets with high
concentration and high vulnerability variance are likely to suffer from
degradation. Part IV.B observed that, given the incentive to do so,
networks are likely to be efficient regulators in markets characterized by
significant network benefits and low concentration.
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A very brief and preliminary look at a few network industries seems
to support these expectations. The diamond exchange industry, the cotton
exchange industry, and internet auction websites all involve many
relatively small firms and significant network benefits. It seems the main
opportunistic threats these industries are concerned with are of the breach
type, i.e., primarily fraud and insolvency. In these circumstances, we
would expect networks to be good regulators. In fact, networks do indeed
take active roles in monitoring, deterring, and punishing breach in each
of these industries.163 Government regulation is not as intensive; none of
these industries is closely regulated, and though the FTC is active in
prosecuting internet fraud, the larger internet websites, such as eBay,
take a leading role in instituting antifraud mechanisms.164
On the other hand, the internet backbone industry and the credit card
industry (in certain countries) tend to be dominated (in each relevant
geographic market) by a few large firms. In many regions, the preregulation (i.e., nineteenth-century) American rail industry was likewise
dominated by a few large firms.165 In these industries, we would expect
degradation, rather than breach, to be the primary concern.166
Consequently, we would expect networks to be poor regulators and
networks should therefore be less prevalent in these industries than
collections of bilateral or small multilateral connections, which can be
governed by transaction regulation.167 The framework discussed in this
Article would also predict that these industries would be less resistant to
government regulation since government regulation would be more
effective than the network counterpart. Indeed, all these industries are in
fact regulated by government and, at least in the rail industry, scholars

163. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 30 (diamond industry); Bernstein, supra note 39
(cotton industry); Snyder, supra note 96 (internet auction websites).
164. See Snyder, supra note 96.
165. The nineteenth-century rail industry is examined, rather than the contemporary one,
because regulation, which was significantly increased in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century, affects the industry structure. The industry structure observed in a regulated
industry may have more to do with a regulator’s presence and preferences than with private ordering.
166. See, e.g., Cremer, Rey & Tirole, supra note 74 (regarding degradation concerns in the
internet backbone industry).
167. For a discussion of the circumstances in which transaction regulation is preferable to
network regulation in the context of the natural gas industry, see Thomas P. Lyon & Steven C.
Hackett, Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long-term Contracting in
Natural Gas, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 380, 384–85 (1993).
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indicate that government regulation was actually welcomed by the
railroad companies.168
V. CONCLUSION
The vast majority of private legal systems examined by the privateordering literature are networks—institutions that facilitate network
effects. This is no accident; network effects are powerful norm-enforcing
tools. This Article examines the implications of network effects on
private ordering. First, it identifies norm-enforcement mechanisms that
take advantage of network effects and that are therefore used by
networks to regulate. Second, it identifies a type of norm violation
strategy called degradation that has yet to be explored by the privateordering literature and that is facilitated by network effects. Third, it
determines the market structure characteristics that are conducive to the
efficient operation of the enforcement mechanisms, as well as the market
structure characteristics that are conducive to degradation. Combining
these together reveals the market structure most favorable to the
regulatory abilities of networks. Primarily, these market characteristics
are a high level of network effects and low concentration in the market in
which the network members operate. Unsurprisingly, these are the same
prevailing market characteristics in many (if not most) PLSs described in
the private-ordering literature.
Networks employ four mechanisms to decrease opportunism: an
information mechanism (collection and dissemination of information on
the credibility of firms in order to facilitate independent decisions on the
feasibility of transacting), an exclusion mechanism (depriving a member
of access to the network), a control mechanism (centralized control of
transacting facilities and other members’ assets), and a switching
mechanism (efficient replacement of failed transactions with alternative
ones).
Network effects do not only assist in enforcing norms. They also
induce a special type of norm violation, called degradation. Degradation
is a predatory act that weakens the network, which harms smaller firms
more than larger ones, thereby giving larger firms an advantage over
168. See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877–1916, at 3 (1965) (“Indeed,
the railroads, not the farmers and shippers, were the most important single advocates of federal
regulation from 1877 to 1916. Even when they frequently disagreed with the details of specific
legislation, they always supported the principle of federal regulation as such.”); SUSAN PERVIANT
LEE & PETER PASSELL, A NEW ECONOMIC VIEW OF AMERICAN HISTORY 324–25 (1979); PAUL
MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULATION (1965).
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smaller competitors. Market structure and the number and relative size of
network members affect the likelihood that a network will suffer from
degradation. Markets containing a few large firms with a high variance in
their individual vulnerabilities are particularly susceptible to degradation.
When degradation is a feasible strategy for a network member, it is
difficult for a regulator to deter it. Both private and public regulators
have problems distinguishing harmful degradation from efficient
reduction in network connectivity. Private regulators, including
networks, are also hindered in their ability to punish degrading parties
because their enforcement mechanisms tend to be least effective in
conditions that are most conducive to degradation. Thus, parties often
turn to the public legal system to remedy degradation.
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